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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ELIZABETH ANN BARSON, a ) 
minor, by and through her ) Case No. 18254 
Guardian Ad Litem, DENNIE ) 
J. BARSON and KATHLEEN W. ) RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
BARSON, ) 
) 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
E. R. SQUIBB & SONS, INC., ) 
) 
Defendants-Appellants. ) 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action by Elizabeth Ann Barson (now nine 
years of age) for birth defects, including amelia (complete 
absence of the arms), caused by injections of the Squibb 
drug Delalutin in her mother during the mother's first 
three months of pregnancy. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
This case was tried before a jury in Logan, Utah, the 
trial resulting in a verdict for Elizabeth in the sum of 
$1,500,000.00 against E. R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. (Motions 
had earlier been granted dismissing the defendants, Dr. Spencer 
Parkinson- and Squibb Corporation.) 
Following trial and entry of judgment on the verdict, 
Squibb moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and, in 
the alternative, for a new trial. Subsequent to filing the 
original motion for new trial, a second motion for new trial 
was filed on the grounds of alleged newly discovered evidence. 
The three motions were extensively briefed and presented 
in-oral argument, whereupon the Court denied all posttrial 
motions under Order dated January 29, 1982. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Elizabeth Ann Barson seeks affirmation of the jury verdict, 
1 
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the ju~gment rendered on that verdict, and o:e the O;i:;-der of the 
trial Court deriy.ing Squibb's posttrial" motion;:;. 
~TATEMENT -OF THE FACTS 
This Court in THOMSON v. CONDAS, 493 P.2d 639 (Utah 1972) 
admonished the.appellants that it is not permissible on 
appellate review to recite evidence most favorable to its 
contention to the exclusion of other evidence favorable to 
respondent. 
A readi!lg of the appellant's brief makes it clear that 
Squibb has not related the facts upon which the jury relied 
in rendering its verdict nor the facts upon which the District 
Court relied in denying Squibb's posttrial motions. Squibb 
merely sets forth the facts supporting its position at 
trial. This position was rejected both by the jury and the 
trial court. 
More importantly, in a number of critical instances, 
Squibb has improperly related the status of the evidence. · 
(Accordingly, we are providi!1g a statement of facts and 
specifics where Squibb's brief, by ignoring substantial, 
competent evidence, misleads.) 
I. THE FACTS REGARDING 'ELrZABETH BARSON AND HER MOTHER, KATHY 
A. Events befo·re· the· birth of Elizabeth 
The Barson family, consisti!lg of Mr. Dennie Barson and 
his wife Kathleen and their two older children, Tod and 
Tammie, have made their home in Clarkston, Utah (Tr. 336). 
The two older children were born followi!1g uncomplicated 
pregnancies, and as healthy, normal children (Tr. 337, 348). 
In June of 1972, Kathy Barson missed a menstrual cycle 
(Tr. 342-343). The doctor who had taken care of her duri!1g 
the two previous pregnancies had passed away (_Tr. 337}, and 
the office of Dr. Spencer :Parkinson in L~gan was contacted. 
She was. given an appointment for A~gust 4th, but near the 
last week of July Kathy noticed some spotti!lg and called Dr. 
2 
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Parkinson's nurse. As a result, she went to the office on 
July 26, 1972 (Tr. 338-339). 
Dr. Parkinson.did not make a physical examination at that 
time {Tr. 379-380); he told her he was going to give her a 
drug which would help prevent miscarri~ge (Tr. 340-341). Kathy 
had no history of misca~riage, and she had taken no medication 
prior to July 26th. Dr. Parkinson told Kathy the shot would 
help to stop the ·spotti!lg and not to worry, that it was 
harmless and was a hormone women have in their bodies (Tr. 341). 
Delalutin (17-alpha hydroxyprogesterone caproate) was 
administered to Kathy on July 26th. A second shot was given 
on August 4th, and a third shot in October (Tr. 344, 370). 
B. The Birth ·o·f E"l.iz·abeth 
On March 26, 1973, Elizabeth was born (Tr. 347) 
with total absence of arms (Tr. 372, 974, 1724). 
Examinations were conducted on Elizabeth, both in 
the Budge Medical Clinic in Logan, in Primary Children's 
Hospital at Salt Lake City, and in the Shriner's Crippled 
Children Facility, Salt Lake City (P. Ex. 2,3,4), and it was 
confirmed that Elizabeth had other birth defects: 
1. Coloboma of her r ~-ght eye, meani!lg the failure 
of the iris to form completely (Tr. 430, 680); 
2. Hypoplasia, meaning the underdevelopment of the 
lower portion of the face (Tr. 429, 680). The 
upper jaw is slightly underdeveloped, but the 
lower jaw is grossly underdeveloped (Tr. 681). 
3. Her to!lgue is smaller than normal (Tr. 429). 
4. "Atresia of the ear canals," meani!lg lack of 
development of the canal. The openings into 
her ears were and still are extremely small, caus-
ing certain permanent hearing deficiencies (Tr. 
428, 1433). Additionally, her ears are deformed, 
they are small and are lower set on the head than 
. . -
normal (Tr. 1430). 
3 
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5. Early X-ray s~ggested some abnormality of kidney 
(Tr. 974).. There have been no recent X-ray~ to 
verify whether this problem still exists. 
6.. Scoliosis, some curvature of the spine (Tr. 424-425, 
974) • 
7.. A rectal :tag which was surgically removed (Tre 
466, 681). 
Chromosome tests showed normal (Tr. 463). A letter 
from Dr. Vincent Riccardi, attached.to plaintiff's Exhibit 
3, states in part, "The consensus is that Elizabeth's {disorder / _ 
does not represent any known heritable disorder, and also 
that her constellation of features might well represent the 
VACTERL Syndrome and therefore the possibility that there 
might be an association with progestational agents used 
duri~g the pregnancy." Dr. Riccardi is a. genetics specialis~ 
from Denver who came to Utah to do genetic counseling prior 
to the time the State of Utah had a genetics counselor (Tr. 
466) • 
II. THE FACTS ON CAUSATTON 
As the fetus develops, there is a period called the 
time of "organogenesis", which refers to the period in 
which different tissues and o~gans are being formed or a 
part of the body is bei~g formed. It is duri~g this period 
that the fetus can be dam~ged by a dr~g taken by the 
mother (Tr. 694, 1229}. 
That Delalutin is a terat~gen* (dr~g which causes birth 
defects), and that in medical probability Elizabeth's birth 
defects were caused by the administration of Delalutin to 
her mother were established thro~gh the testimony 
of three nationally rec~gnized and h~ghly qualified doctors, 
James Nora,.· Alan Done and Allen Goldman. (Tr. 1093; Tr. 
2 3 7 9 ; Tr . .118 .. ). . 
*The words uteratology" and "teratogen" are derived from the 
Greek word "tera" trrionster) and the Latin word "genesis" 
(to create) • 
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III. THE F"ACT8 'IN THE.DEVELOPMENT, MARKETING 
AND TESTING OF" DELALUTIN 
Delalutin was developed and patented by the German 
manufacturer, Scharing, A.G., which licensed its patent to 
Squibb in 1955. The drug is a steroid or hormone (Tr. 1035), 
a specific chemical compound, generically designated 
17-alpha hydroxyprogesterone caproate (Tr. 554, 1911). Since 
Delalutin is a specific chemical compound with a specific 
organic structure, the composition of the drug never changed 
and is the same today as when first marketed. (Tr. 554). 
In 1956 Squibb commenced marketing the drug in the 
United States (Tr. 554) for a number of symptoms, including 
use in pregnant women for prevention of habitual and re~urrent 
abortion, and for prevention of threatened abortion in women 
who had no history of abortion or miscarriage. 
A package insert is required to disclose to the doctors 
who prescribe the drug, information such as: 
1. The conditions for which the drug might be useful;. 
2. The manner of and quantity to be administered; 
3. Any warnings about side effects; 
4. Any contraindications for use of the drug. 
The wording of the package insert given with the drug 
in 1956 was Squibb's, not FDA mandated as suggested, and 
contained the following statement under the section entitled 
"Precautions and Undesirable Effects 11 : 
"There are no known contraindications to the use of 
Delalutin in man. 11 [Ex. lO(a) and lO(b)J. 
over the years from 1956 to 1979, the pack.age insert on 
Delalutin was revised by Squibb approximately 19 times (Ex. 
lO(c) through lO(t}]. 
For example, in 1964 the package insert and PDR were· 
revised to contain, amo~g other things, these words: 
"Although other progestational agents may cause viri-
1 i za tion or adema in some individuals, Delalutin 
(hydroxyprogesterone caproate) appears to be singularly 
free from ~hese undesirable ~ctions." 
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Dr. Charles Linegar, a Senior Advisor of Pharmacology 
for Squibb, testified he ·knew of reports in 1955 that said 
17-alpha h~droxypro~estero~e ~as andr~geriic, i.e., caused 
rnasculinization (Tr. 1699}e The fact that progestogens 
were causing masculi~ization was reasonably well accepted 
around 1959-1960 (Tr. 741}. 
In 1966, the package insert was changed to include the 
following statement: 
"There have been rare reports of virilization* of the 
female fetus with inconclusive cause-effect relationship 
in patients who have received hydroxyprogesterone 
caproa te." [Ex. 10 (h) ] · 
The testimony of Dr. Nora and Dr. Done established that 
this virilization or masculinzation of the girl baby is1 in 
fact, a teratogenic (Tr. 743, 1006) action. Dr. Done, on 
cross-examination, testified he did not believe Delalutin 
was inactive as far as causing masculinization (Tr. 769). 
Wording about masculinization or virilization saw another 
change in the December 1970 revision of the package insert 
where the following words were added: 
".Masculinization of the female fetus has occurred when 
progestins have been used in pregnant women." [Ex. 
10 (m) ] . · 
In 1979 the package insert was revised to include, in addi-
tion to the warning about masculinization, a special box warn-
ing against use in the first four months of pregnancy, the first 
page of the package insert and the opening portion of the 
Physician's Desk Reference containing the text which 
follows: 
* Virilization or masculinization is a phenomenon where a girl 
'baby is born with partial male genitalia. 
6 
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DELALUTl i\l ~ 
Hydroxyprogestarone Caproate lnjecti~n USP 
WARNING 
THE USE OF PROGEST ATIONAL AGENTS DURING 
THE FIRST FOUR MONTHS OF PREGNANCY IS NOT RECOMMENDED 
Pro~~tational ai:?ent'i have been used bednning with the first 
trime5ter of pregnam.:y in an attempt to pre~·ent habitual abortion 
or treat thrcac~ncd abortion. Th.:re is no adequate evidence that 
such u'e is eff~tive and there is evidence of potential harm to the 
fotus when such drul!S arc given during the first four months of 
·pregnancy. Furthermore, in the vast majority of women, the 
· cause of abortion is a defective ovum, which progestational 
agents could not be expected co influence. In addition, the use of 
progescational agents. with their uterinc-relaxanc properties, in 
patients with fertiliud defective ova may cause a delay in spon-
t:mcous abortion. Therefore. the use of such drugs during the 
first four months of pregnancy is not recommended. 
~---------,..----------------
Several reports suggest an association between intrauterine ex-
posure to female sex hormones and congenital anomalies, in-
cluding congenital heart defects and limb reduction defects . ._, 
One study~ estimated a 4.7-fold increased risk of limb reduction 
defects in infants exposed in utero to sex hormones (oral con-
traceptives. hormone withdrawal test for pregnancy, or attempted 
treatment for threatened abortion). Some of these exposures were 
very short and involved only a few days of treatment. The data 
suggest that the risk of limb reduction defects in exposed fetuses is 
somewhat less than 1 in 1,000. 
If the patient is exposed to Delalutin during the first four 
months of pregnancy or if she becomes pregnant while taking this 
drug. she should be apprised of the potential risks to the fetus. 
IV. FACTS OF SQUIBB'S FAILURE TO PERFORM TERATOLOGICAL TESTS 
Teratology tests, simply stated, are those tests made in 
pregnant animals ·during organogenesis to determine whether the 
drug causes fetal abnormalities or death (Tr. 1698). 
Squibb did not know what tests Scharing had conducted 
(Tr. 1702). The drug was marketed by Squibb commencing in 
1956 (Tr. 554) without performing any teratology tests 
(Tr. 619), and Squibb has not made any such tests to this date. 
(Tr. 559-560). 
Some guidelines for teratology studies were established. 
by the FDA as early as 1959. (Tr. 737) 
Dr. Alan Done worked in the FDA developing guidelines 
for the agency and the industry. One of his-tasks was the 
development of a strategy for teratol~gy testing (Tr. 672-
673). 
14: 
He testified as follows at Tr. 737, lines 1 through 
Q. Now within your personal knowledge, would you 
state whether or not there came a time when the F.D.A 
suggested to the "drug companies that teratology studies 
should be performed~ 
·A. Did you say companies, meaning companies in 
general or this one? 
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A. Companies in gerierale 
A. Yes. In 1962 th~ P.D.A began to require tera-
togeriicity studies ·for new dr~gs that might be or 
wer·e definitely going to be used j..n pr~gnant women. They 
also at that time ·requested that drugs that had a. good 
likelihood of being used ·o·r· we.r·e· be·in:g "us·ed in pregnant 
women be ·studied likewise. That wasn't at that point a 
requirement, however. (Emphasis supplied) 
Dr .. Hans Keysser, employed by Squibb in 1956 to start a 
pathol~gy department (Tr. 1215}, testified that original 
. guidelines came from the F.D.A. in 1962 or 1963 (Tr. 1226). 
The Guidelines were revised and Ex. 62 is a copy of the 
1966 Guidelines .. ~-~·The Guidelines generally required that a 
number of pr~gnant animals, usually two or more speciesl be 
injected with the drug at the critical period of organogenesis, 
and that the offspring then be examined for structural and 
visceral defects. 
Squibb's witness, Dr. Brent (Tr. 2334} said such a study 
would cost about $8,000. 
From 1959 to 1972, widely published medical literature, 
alerted the industry to the suspected teratologic effects of 
pr~gestational agents. A listing of some of the literature 
is provided in Part B of this Statement of Facts, pages 11 
to 13 and it shows reports as early as 1942. 
By 1962 the da~ger of drugs taken duri~g pregnancy 
causing birth defects was known and was dramatically brought 
to the attention of the world through the Thalidomide tragedy. 
Dr. Dene's testimony at Tr. 740, line 25, through Tr. 741, 
line 21, discusses not only the Thalidomide disaster, but 
the masculinization effects that were being observed. gener-
ally when progestogens were. given to women during pregnancy. 
Dr. Done said that reports of such occurri~g were received in 
the mid-1950s, and that it was reasonably well accepted 
around 1959 or 1960. Neither Dr. Done nor Dr. Nora knew of 
any tests which ·could conceivably replace teratol~gic 
testing nor the· need to see if Delalutin harmed the fetus. 
8 
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(Dr. Done, Tr. 743, lines 5 through 20; Dr. Nora, Tr. 1019-
1020 and Tr. 1165). 
Every one of Squibb's witnesses when asked acknowledged 
that Squibb had a duty to the public beyond that required by 
the FDA. Dr. Lavy, Director of Regulatory Affairs for Squibb, 
so testified at Tr. 630 and Tr. 640. Dr. Robert R. Franklin, 
one of Squibb's experts, acknowledged the need for a teratologic 
study of Delalutin in his testimony at Tr. 1871-1872. 
Unfortunately, and despite the obvious need for teratology 
testing, Squibb provided no financial backing, either so far 
as its own testi~g and experiments or testi~g and experiments 
by the scientific community outside the o~ganization of Squibb~ 
Exhibits 731 and 736 are letters written by a Dr. Collin 
Kendall, Squibb's Associate Medical Director, to a Dr. ~· C. 
Johnson of Johns Hopkins Hospital. Those letters explain 
Squibb's lack of interest, the money involved and the sales 
problems with Delalutin, as well as the fact that the FDA 
statistics division considered progestin as having a 
statistically s~gnificant teratogenicity duri~g pregnancy. 
Although those letters are in July and September 1973, 
nevertheless, they certainly establish the background and 
facts as they existed prior to the injection of Delalutin 
in Kathy Barson. 
Squibb failed to establish firm l~nes of responsibility 
to· assure proper testi~g. Betweell: 195.S/and 1961, various 
in-house memos of Squibb· (Exhibits 230, 231, 232, 777, 779)* 
show the confusion. Dr. Reifenstein was Squibb's doctor 
pretty much in cha~ge of promoting and getting Delalutin on 
the market, as well as a number of the other hormonal drugs 
being promoted by Squibb. These exhibits show that he 
apparently tho~ght certain testing was being done by others, 
*Exhibits 232 and 230 constitute Appendices "B" and "C" 
hereto, respectively,· Appendix "B" readi~g, in part:· 
" •. I think your surprise at the Coordination Meeting 
in learning of the absence of toxicity data on Delalutin 
was surpassed by that of the laboratory men there, who 
were amazed that clinical investigation had been under-
taken with ·this new drug for which they had not been asked 
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whereas they assumed that he was taking care of this. The 
fact is that no ter·atol~gy .studies were ever conducted. The 
fact, further, is that there was npt even a pathol~9y depart-
ment in Squibb ·until 1956. 
Mr. Michael Bo~gi.ovanni was president of the operati~g 
company of Squibb in the United States at the time the suit 
was filed and at the time ·of trial.. He had been with the 
company for many years in various man~gement capacities. 
Altho~gh he knew about Delalutin as a product, he had never 
reviewed any of the history of testi~g and development because 
the medical. g~oup did n<:>t report to the president of the U.S. 
company. (Tr. 523, 524, 529-530) 
In fact, the chief operati~g officer did not know whether 
or not any teratologic studies had ever been conducted on 
Delalutin and had no knowledge r~garding warnings to doctors 
or the public in_ general relating to the use of Delalutin 
during pregnancy. {Tr. 529 thro~gh 531) 
Mr. Bongiovanni was aware of the Thalidomide disaster in 
the early 1960s and of the FDA requiri~g teratology studies 
on new drugs (Tr. 536); but Mr .. Bongiovanni stated he did 
not know if Squibb had teratological testing capabilities 
or not because he had other things to worry about other than 
research and development of the 'drug. In other words, he 
simply had no knowledge about a testi~g pr~gram or what test-
ing s·quibb did beyond whatever FDA required. (Tr. 536-541) 
The management of Squibb made it clear that even if there 
were a,safe~y problem known to the management, that no scien-
tifiq underta~ing ·:or testing of a product would be done until 
. . 
the scientific people within the Squibb organization so advised. 
There was never, apparently, advice to test Delalutin for tera-
tology and it was never done. (Tr. 545 thro~gh 551) 
V ~- EVIDENCE IN "RECORD REFUTING CERTAIN STATEMENTS ·rN 
SQUIBB'S.BRIEF 
Several sec"tions of the Squibb brief mislead a reader 
by ignori!lg the ·rec"ord. 
10 
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Squibb opens its a~gument at page 22 with the 
following statement: 
F'ACT: 
"When the plaintiff's mother received Delalutin 
injections in July and August of 1972, no infor-
mation had appeared in s6ientific publications 
which ·suggested any association between pro-
gestational agents generally and limb anomaiies." 
The record is replete with scientific publications prior 
to 1972 showing the relationship between progestational agents 
and birth defects. If the purpose of Squibb's opening sentence 
is to suggest to this Court that it had no knowledge of tera-
tological effects of Delalutin prior to 1972, the statement 
is most misleading bedause, although the studies had not 
connected limb anomalies per se, they had since 1942 shown a 
connection between birth defects in general and progestational 
agents. 
A partial listing of those treatises from 1942 through 
1972 is set forth in the testimony of Dr. Allen Goldman as 
follows: 
Courier and Jost report in 1942 showed progestational 
agents have masculinizing effect on females and 
feminizing effect on males (rabbits). (Tr. 2360-61) 
In 1959 Dr. Kaplan reported hypospadius in the New 
England Journal when the mother had taken progesterone 
and DES (hypospadius is the external manifestation of 
feminization that occurs in boys). (Tr. 2362) 
In 1959 a German named Uhlicz reported a case of limb 
defects in a child whose mother had taken progesterone 
and DES. (Tr. 2363) 
In 1960 Rivesz reported that progesterone itself could 
virilize rat females and Suchowsky and Junkmann in 
Germany reported the same in rats there. (Tr. 2363) 
In 1961 Moore· in the United States reported a variety 
of congenital anomalies including malformations of 
kidney and heart in rats treated with progesterone. 
(Tr. 2363) 
In 1961 Kooperman reported two cases of hypospadius 
occurring in humans whose mother had been treated on 
11 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the one hand with ·progesterone and .on the other with 
1 7-ace toxy pr~ges terone. (Tr. 2 3 6 3 l 
In 1961 Plotz ·showed that progesterone crossed the 
placenta using Delalutin. (Tr. 23631 
In 1962 Lerner (of Squibb) reported a series of studies 
with proge~tins, one observation on one dose of Delalutin 
given to rats where he had four out of 100 with inter-
. sexes. (Tr. 2364 l 
In 1963 a "double blind study" on 50 patients receiving 
a placebo or Delalutin was performed, and when the · 
code was broken it showed that there was no effectiveness 
in the dr~g whatsoever. (Tr. 2365) 
In 1964 Burstein and Wasserman had 1% of their patients 
having clitoral enlargement and in 1964 Junkmann had 
hypo~padius due to progestins. (Tr. 2365) 
In 1965 Moller and Fuchs did a double blind study with 
another progestin, Provera, with a result of no effec-
tiveness of the drug. (Tr. 2366) 
In 1965 Govaert in Belgium did a double blind study on 35 
cases using Delalutin and found no effectiveness for 
threatened abortion. (Tr~ 2366) 
In 1966 Piotorsky in Poland gave progesterone itself to 
three different species and the chickens had a variety 
of limb defects. On the rabb~ts progesterone virilized 
the female rabbit pups, and on the rats they produced a 
variety of defects including cardiac defects and limb 
anomalies. (Tr. 2366) 
In 1967 Goldman and Bongiovanni published a paper showing 
how the enzyme 2 Beta-61-hydrogenase (which is an enzyme 
involved very early in all steroids or hormone synthesis) 
causes a disease in humans. (Tr. 2367) 
Goldman's experiments showed that the pr~gestins inhibited 
this same bacterial enzyme in the same quantitative 
relationship as the amount that was required to produce 
the defects in animals that had been reported by others. 
(Delalutin was one of the drugs utilized in that experi-
ment. ) (Tr . 2 3 7 O 1 · 
Later tests established that the.reason 17-hydroxy caproate 
did not inhibit the enzyme in earlier tests was that it 
was highly insoluble in the methynol which was the 
standard solution used at that time, but when Goldnan cnangerl 
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to a. good solubilizer na.med dimethyl sulfoxide, it did 
. go in the solution and h~d the same degree of inhibition 
on the bacteria enzyme as the progesterone did ;itself. 
(Tr. 2370} . 
In 1967 Dr. Gal reported women who took hormonal pregnancy 
tests h~d a highei risk of. h~ving central nervous s~stem 
defects in their offspri~g. (Tr. 2370) 
In 1968 two French ·scientists, Serment and Ruf, reported 
cases of virilizati6n and hypospadius produced by Delalutin 
among other things. (Tr. 2371) 
In 1970, Aarskog in Norway performed studies showing that 
the animal models and the humans reacted similarly to 
the enzyme blockage and demonstrating that the animal 
and human embryology was similar. He did further work 
on that in 1979. (Tr. 2371) 
In 1970, Giddley used the progestin northynodrel ahd 
found various defects in mice, including skeletal anom-
alies. (Tr. 2371-2) 
Subsequent to 1972, Dr. Goldman's testimony recounted the 
following treatises which Squibb has not bro~ght to the 
attention of this Court, indicating the teratological 
propensities of the ~rug: 
In 1973, Levy in a prospective study of progestins, found 
an increased risk of transposition of the great vessels 
in the ·heart of the offspring. (Tr. 2372) 
In 1974, Sweet at the Mayo Clinic, found hypospadius 
significantly higher in those patients receiving Delalutin 
than in his control population. (Tr. 2372) 
In 1974 Janerich found an increased risk of limb reduc-
tion and hypospadius in patients receiving a variety of 
progestins. (Tr. 2372) · 
In 1975, Harlap, in a study in Jerusalem, found an 
increased risk of heart and limb defects. (Tr. 2372) 
In 1976, a colleague of Aarskog reported a case of five 
of the VATER defects after use of pr~gestins. {Tr. 2373) 
In 1975, Greeman reported an increased heart and limb 
defects with hormonal pregnancy tests which contained 
pr~gestins and estr~gen. · (Tr. 2373) 
13 
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In 1976, Hellstrom reported a case of limb defects due 
to pr~gest~geris. (Tr. 23731 
In 1977, Janerich reported another study w;ith increased 
risk of congeriital heart defec'ts and then, in 1976, there 
was another case reported of VACTERL in Italy. (Tr. 2373) 
In 1977, Hynoneri in the ·Boston study, took the national 
collaborative project data involvi!lg 50,000 pregnancies 
in 11 different hospitals, and using the prospective 
study methodology, found an increased risk of congenital 
defects. (Tr.· 2373) 
In 1978, Nora published a study showing increased risk of 
congenital heart defects and limb defects from use of 
progestational agents. (Tr. 2374) 
In 1978, Andrews and Staples used the progestogen Provera 
and found that it produced cleft palate in rabbitso 
(Tr. 237 4) 
Squibb (p. 4 of brief} states other synthetic progesta-
tional _agents marketed by other pharmaceutical houses, 
although similar, had marked differences from both Delalutin 
and naturally formed progesterone. Squibb insisted at trial 
that Delalutiri does not cause birth defects and, at p~ge 13, 
argues that the testimony of Dr. Done relative to the literature 
about the teratol~gic characteristics of progestational 
agents does not apply to Delalutin. 
FACT: 
The testimony, Tr. 1015, lines 2 thro~gh 22, of Dr. 
Nora reads: 
Q. Now what is the fact as to whether norethisterone 
acetate and Delalutin or both are progestational 
agents? 
A. Well, my feeling is that the body does not have 
enough receptors, and it is just not my feeling, it 
is in basic textbooks of pharmacology that the receptors 
themselves are rather nonspecific.· It can't--it can't 
sense that there is an extra chemical group sticking off 
one of these rings in one and not an extra in another 
necessarily. we just don't have that much capacity in 
our body, so my feeling with regard to the progesterones 
and the pr~ges·t~geris is that they are recognized by 
the same ·rec'eptor· as if they were all the same medication. 
They go to the DNA and bring out the enzyme reaction 
that.breaks them down into similar epoxides. 
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Now whether each and every ring formed for all of those 
is recognized the ·same way, you know, we don't have 
that knowle~ge yet. We know that there are probably 
at least 30 differ·ent enzymes called cytochrome P-4 50 
and yet there are many.thousands of potential drugs and 
chemicals like this that would use cytochrome P-450 to 
start the breakdown of the dr~g. 
At Tr. 711, line 15, through line 6 on Tr. 712, Dr. Done 
said: 
A. As I understand and remember the question, it 
does have significance to look at all progesterones 
or even all hormones when the question before us has 
to do with ·a specific one of them. 
Q. Why do you say that? 
A. Well, with regard to all progestogens or pro-
gesterones, either one, in my opinion is evidence 
that if a drug is an active progestogen or progesterone, 
that it will have some difference in potency with regard 
to particular effects; that is, some effects may require 
higher doses than others, but it will produce all or 
essentially all of the effects produced by other pro-
. gesterones. 
In other words, there are no differences in the quali-
tative sense, a difference in a potency and therefore 
dose with a particular effect, and they may be different 
for different effects, but they all possess, in my 
opinion, the same effects. 
Squibb asserts no need for teratologic testing of 
Delalutin when the FDA Teratology Guide of 1966 was issued 
because of human experience in use of the dr~g, and at page 
5 of its brief claims Squibb and the FDA agreed that "further 
animal testing under these new Guidelines was unnecessary." 
FACT: 
Squibb attempts to create an illusion to claim an agree-
ment that no further testi?g was required when, actually, 
no teratol~gic testi~g had ever been performed. 
Squibb's only animal testing had been to determine 
if the dr~g caused irritation at the situs of injection or 
whether it killed the ·rats in which it was injected. 
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Dr. Lin~gar of Squibb may have had conversation with 
people in the ·FDA concer.ni~g tes.ti!lg, but the. fact omitted 
by Squibb is that the -~DA had no power to require terato-
l~gical tes.ti!lg of dr~gs which had been in use. 
What Squibb failed to include in its brief was the testl.mony 
of Dr. Nora, Tr. 1019, line ·25, through Tr. 1020, line 14, 
readi!lg: 
Q. Doctor, as of say 1972 and let's say the beginning 
of 1972 and based upon the extent of medical knowledge 
that was available 'at that time, if it were the fact 
that there had been no teratological tests performed on 
Delalutin by Squibb, would you consider it proper 
pharmaceutical practice to make that drug available for 
use in pregnant women absent those teratol~gical studies? 
MR. MANK: Your honor, we would object. There's 
been no basis, no foundation for this witness to qualify 
in the area of pharmaceuticals. 
THE COURT: Overruled. 
A. I believe that the information was available that 
would make a prudent manufacturer of a product designed 
to be given to pregnant women to want to see whether 
it would harm the babies of the pregnant women. 
Omitted was the testimony of Squibb's own Director of Drug 
Regulatory Affairs, Dr. Norman Lavy, at Tr. 639, line 23, 
through Tr. 640, line 2: 
Q. Do you think your duty to the public is only what 
the FDA requires you to do or do you think Squibb of itself 
as a manufacturer of pharmaceuticals has a duty to maintain 
standards? 
A. I think it's clear that we have a duty. 
Also not mentioned in Squibb's brief is Dr. Lavy's 
interoffice memo of October 22, 1974 (Exhibit No. 75 attached to 
this brief as Appendix "A"). 
Five Y.ears prior to Dr. Lavy' s memo, Appendix "A", in 
1969, shown by Exhibit 53_5, p~ge 6, (labeled page 1485 in 
lower right hand cornet}, Squibb scientist, Dr. Park, 
s~ggested the following wording be placed on Gestest 
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labeli~g, which ·s~ggesti.on the authorities in Squibb re-
jected: 
"Progestogens given in the first trimester have been 
incriminated as ·causative in the induction of fetal 
anomalies. A direc·t cause and effect relationship is 
uncertain but should be considered even though Gestest 
is administered for only two days." · 
Dr. Park used the word "progestogens" which refers to 
all progestational agents. 
Finally, at pages 4 and 5 of their brief is a strange 
and untrue statement: 
"The knowledge that drugs could cross the placenta 
and adversely affect a developing fetus was first 
gained as a result of the experience in the e~rly 
1960s with Thalidomide ... " 
Squibb then argues that it was prejudiced by the submission of 
both the negl~gence and the strict liability causes of action 
to the jury, in that the so-called "state of the art" or state 
of medical knowledge as of 1972 (the date of injection of the 
drug in Mrs. Barson) would not have put Squibb on notice that 
the drug was dangerous. Along with Dr. Park's warning and 
given the Thalidomide experience many years earlier, this 
is an astounding assertion. 
FACT: 
In asserting the above Squibb also fails to recognize 
testimony of Dr. Allen Goldman, as earlier discussed in 
this brief. 
The medical research papers presented by Dr. ·Goldman 
demonstrate the existence of adequate literature relating 
progestational agents to birth defects to place·Squibb on 
knowledge, and it knew, or should have known, many years 
prior to the 1972 date of hazards in the use of Delalutin 
by a pregnant woman. Desp;i.te this, no testing was done and 
no warning_ given. 
17 
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ARGUMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
Squibb's brief presents its argument under five prin-
cipal points, I through V. These are Squibb's assignments 
of error to this Court, and we will discuss those various 
points in the same order as presented by Squibb. 
Points I and IV criticize admission of evidence. Points 
II and III criticize instructions and submissions of issues 
to the jury. Point V objects to and c.riticizes the action of 
the trial court in denyi~g a new trial as requested by 
Squibb on supposedly newly discovered evidence. 
Rulings on the admissibility of evidence and on motions 
for a new trial are_ generally within the discretion of the 
trial court, and its ruli~gs will not be reversed on appeal 
absent a clear abuse of discretion. The record demonstrates, 
as will be discussed, that the trial court's rulings on 
evidentiary matters were sound and do not manifest an abuse 
of discretion. Likewise, the denial of Squibb's motion for. 
a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence was only 
after the trial court found there was nothi!lg "newly dis-
covered" about the supposed evidence and merely reflected 
matters which had been thoroughly· examined in the testimony 
of both parties duri~g the trial. 
The trial court concluded that the continuing conflict 
of opinion among the scientific community as to whether or 
not Delalutin caused limb reduction birth defects had been 
resolved in this case by the f indi~g of the jury on that 
issue. (_R. 1440) • 
Despite Squibb's assertions that the trial court's 
instructions to the jury were vague and misleadi~g and 
enabled the jury to hold Squibb absolutely liable, the 
instructions defined Squibb's duty in terms of reasonable-
ness and cannot be read as to support Squibb's contention that 
they could be otherwise interpreted, unless one manufactures 
ambiguities and contradictions. 
18 
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The argument in Point III of Squibb's brief that the 
issue of negligence relating to failure to test should 
never have been submitted to the jury, is clearly not sup-
ported by the record. Although this issue was a disputed 
one, nevertheless, the record establishes quite clearly that 
given the evidence and the reasonable inferences that reason-
able minds might well differ and that, accordingly, the 
issue was properly for the jury and has been resolved by the 
jury. 
The jury returned a general verdict. The appellant, 
Squibb, did not request special interrogatories. Distinct 
theories of liability had been pled by respondent, and 
substantial evidence was introduced on each theory. The 
court instructed on each theory. If the Court determines, 
as we believe it should, that the evidence and the instruc-
tions justified a verdict on any one of the theories, then 
the general verdict and the judgment should be affirmed. 
NATIONAL SECURITY BANK v. BUTLER, 129 U.S. 223, 9 S.Ct. 
281, 32 L.Ed. 682 (1889}; BERGER v. SOUTHERN PACIFIC CO~, 
144 C.A.2d 1, 300 P.2d 170 (Cal.App.); 5 Am.Jur.2d, Appeal 
and Error § 787; FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF ALBUQUERQUE v. 
NOR-AM AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS, INC., 88 N.M. 74, 537 P.2d 682 
(197 5) • 
On appeal a presumption exists in favor of the jury 
verdict, and doubts will be resolved to uphold the judgment 
entered on the verdict. GOSSNER v. DAIRYMAN ASSOCIATES, INC., 
(Utah 1980), 611 P.2d 713; REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY OF SALT LAKE 
CITY v. MITSUI INVESTMENT, INC. (Utah 1974), 522 P.2d 1370. 
The evidence is viewed most favorably toward sustaining 
the findings and judgment of the trier of facts. CINTRON v. 
MILKOVICH (Utah 1980), 611 P.2d 730; UTE-CAL LAND DEVELOPMENT 
CORP. v. SATHER (Utah 1980), 605 P.2d 1240. Even where a 
finding is missi'.l'lg (as would be true where a general verdict 
·has been returned rather than special interrogatories), this 
court has held that it may be supplied if consistent with 
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other findings and the judgment of the trial court. NORTHERN 
OIL CO. v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION (Utah 1943), 140 P.2d 329; 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 49(a). 
Where, as here, there has been no request th~t special; 
interrogatories be submitted, the appellant has waived his 
right to assert error on a particular issue or theory if the 
general verdict will stand on any one issue or theory. Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 49; 76 Am.Jur.2d, Trial, 
§§ 1149, 1176, 1177 and 1180; MURPHY v. DYER (10 CCA 1969) 
4 09 F. 2d 74 7. 
Even where evidence is properly admitted on a given 
theory, in a multiple theory type action, the failure of the 
party against whom the evidence is admitted to request a 
limiting instruction or to object to a failure of the trial 
court to instruct that the evidence may be considered only 
on the theory for which admitted, constitutes a waiver and 
the appellate court will not entertain an assignment of error 
on that_ ground. FARNER v. PACCAR, INC. {8th CCA 1977), 562 
F.2d 518, 528. To the same effect is ROBBINS v. FARMERS 
UNION GRAIN TEID--1INAL ASSOCIATION (8 CCA 1977), 552 F.2d 788, 
795; and GRIGGS v. FIRESTONE TIRE AND RUBBER CO. {8 CCA 
1975), 513 F.2d 851, 857, where certiorari was denied at 
46 L.Ed. 2d 93. 
Sufficient, substantial and competent evidence, under 
proper instructions, exists to support any theory on which 
this case was tried. We believe that the principles of 
appellate review require that the jury verdict not be dis-
turbed and that the judgment be affirmed. Several alternate 
theories were pled and supported by evidence which adequately 
support the verdict and the judgment in addition to those 
as addressed in the Squibb brief. 
The Amended Complaint (R.18) alleged a number of n~gli­
gent acts alleged to have been committed by Squibb which 
were·in addition to negligence in failing to warn and negli-
gence in testing. The Amended Complaint also all~ged that 
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Squibb represented and warranted that Delalutin was safe and 
fit as a therapeutic drug, and that Delalutin was of merchant-
able quality and did not produce any damaging side effects. 
(R.19) 
The instructions covered all of the theories and issues 
which had been proven at trial, including, among others, the 
defect under strict liability theory. Squibb has asserted 
that the only "defect" was the failure to warn. This is not 
true. Barson alleged and proved that Delalutin was defective 
and unreasonably dangerous because the risk of dangers out-
weighed the beneficial use of the product--in short, that it 
was a "bad product," which should not have been marketed at 
all and could not be made safe by any warning. Whether~or 
not this was proved was a question for the jury. The evidence 
certainly established that the Delalutin formula was the same 
now and at trial as when first marketed, and that if it 
produced birth defects in the fetus, whether or not there 
was a warning, it would be a bad product. The evidence and 
the instructions, attacked by Squibb, were wholly proper as 
applied to warranty and strict liability. Where an article 
is of such a character that when used for the purpose for which 
it is made, it is a source of danger if not properly designed 
and fashioned, liability attaches. 
The manufacturer, in this instance Squibb, is liable 
for breach of warranty as well as the tortious wrong to 
persons using the product within the reasonable contemplation 
of the manufacturer. TINNERHOLM v. PARKE, DAVIS & CO. (2nd CCA 
1969) 411 F.2d 48); NEEDHAM v. WHITE LABORATORIES, INC. (7 CCA 
1981}, 639 F.2d 394; GASTON v. HUNTER (Ariz. 1978), 588 P.2d 
326. 
It is, then, respondent Barson's position that there is 
adequate basis for aff irmance of the judgment independent of 
any of the criticisms of evidence and instructions as dis-
cussed in Squibb's brief. Nevertheless, as earlier indicated 
in this brief, we will discuss the points in the order ~s 
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POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
BY ADMITTING THE POST-1972 PACKAGE WARNING 
INSERTS INTO EVIDENCE 
A$ EVIDENTIARY RULINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT SHALL BE 
AFFIRMED ON APPEAL ABSENT AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION 
This Court has refused to reverse the trial court 
based upon admissions or exclusions of evidence unless there 
has been a clear abuse of discretion by the trial court, 
not merely an arguable abuse. TERRY v. ZIONS CO-OP MERCANTILE 
INSTITUTION (Utah 1979), 605 P.2d 314. To be an abuse it 
must be arbitrary, fanciful or unreasonable, somethi~g that 
no reasonable man would take the view adopted by the tr~al 
court. PEEK v. UNITED STATES (9 CCA 1963), 321 F.2d 934, 
942, in which-certiorari was denied, 376 U.S. 954, 84 S.Ct. 
973, 11 L.Ed. 2d 973. 
Admissibility of the post-1972 package warning inserts 
was briefed and argued before the trial court, resulting in 
the admission. Redetermining that ruling as though ruling 
for the first time has been held by this Court not to be its 
function. If there is any reasonable basis to support the 
trial court, it is to be supported. JESPERSON v. JESPERSON 
(Utah 1980), 610 P.2d 326; ALLPHIN REALTY, INC. v. SINE 
(Utah 1979), 595 P.2d 860. 
B. THE POST-1972 PACKAGE WARNINGS WERE ADMISSIBLE 
ON THE STRICT LIABILITY ISSUE AND THEORY 
Rule 51 U.R.E. does not-require exclusion of 
evidence of subsequent remedial measures in-a strict products 
liability action. The Rule provides: 
RULE 51 SUPSEQUENT REMEDIAL CONDUCT 
When after the occurrence of an event remedial 
or precautionary measures are taken, which, if 
taken previously would have tended to make the 
event less likely to occur, evidence of such 
subsequent measures is not admissible to prove 
negligen·ce or culpable conduct in connection with 
the event. (Emphasis supplied) 
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The Rule could not be more clear. N~gligence or 
culpable conduct is not at issue in a strict liability 
case. The Rule applies in a negligence or culpable con-
duct case, but does not apply where the product is un-
reasonably ~a~gerous or defective. 
AULT v. INTERNATIONAL HARVESTER COMPANY (Cal. 1974), 
528 P.2d 1148, is a leadi~g case among those cases holding 
that the subsequent remedial measures doctrine is inappli-
cable in a strict liability action. Section 1151 of the 
California Evidence Code and Rule 51 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence are the same. The Rule is not applied in a strict 
products liability action because of the wording and ex-
clusion of post-remedial action would be contrary to th~ 
public policy of encour~ging a manufacturer to market safer 
products. UNTERBURGER v. SNOW COMPANY, INC., 630 F.2d 599 
(8 CCA 1980); FARNER v. PACCAR, INC. (8 CCA 1977), 562 F.2d 
518; ROBBINS v. FARMERS UNION GRAIN TERMINAL F ... SSOCIATION (8 
CCA 1977), 552 F.2d 788; CAPRARA v. CHRYSLER CORPORATION 
(1979), 423 ·N.Y.S.2d 694; BROWN v. MICHAELS BUSINESS MACHINES 
(1980), 428 N.Y.S.2d 1948; HARLEY-DAVIDSON MOTOR COMPANY v. 
CARPENTER (Fla.App. 1977), 350 S.2d 360; MARTINEZ v. ATLAS 
BOLT AND SCREW CO. (Colo.App. 1981), 636 P.2d 1287; CHART v. 
GENERAL MOTORS CORP. (Wis. 1977), 258 N. W. 2d 680. 
The special liability imposed on manufacturers under the 
Restatement of Torts § 402A was adopted in Utah in ERNEST W. 
HAHN, INC. v. ARMCO STEEL CO. (Utah 1979), 601 P.2d 152. 
Various cases have applied strict liability to prescription 
drug cases. FIRST NATIONAL BANK, ALBUQUERQUE v. NOR-AM 
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS, INC. (N.M. 1975}, 537 P.2d 682, is 
representative of such cases. That case quoted with approval 
Utah's HAHN v. ARMCO STEEL co. case, supra, and specifically 
held that whether or not the dr~g was defective and unreason-
ably da~gerous was a question of fact for the jury. Comments 
j and k.of § 402A of Re~tatement of Torts 2nd are clearly in 
accord. 
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The primary concern of strict liability is with the 
fitness of the product. The product may be defective 
because of its nature, altho\1gh faultlessly made. Liability 
attaches if the product is unreasonably da~gerous with or 
without warning and attaches also if the warni~g was inadequate. 
Under § 402A of the Restatement of Torts 2nd, the 
jury should be entitled to consider any and all evidence 
relevant as to whether or not a product is defective or un-
reasonably dangerous, includi~g subsequent warnings. This 
is especially true where the plaintiff has established a prima 
facie case of causation and a basis to impose strict liability. 
The subsequent remedial measures rule, derived from negligence 
concepts and riddled with exceptions, should not be a basis 
to deny admissi?n of subsequent warnings in strict products 
liability cases. The public policy underlyi~g strict lia-
bility, and as stated by this Court in the HAHN v.ARMCO 
STEEL cas·e,· supra, remains paramount. 
Acceptance of Squibb's argument that there is no differ-
ence between negligence and strict liability theories in a 
dr~g case and that liability is determined as to the duty 
to warn on the "state of the art" at the time, would effectively 
reject and discard the public policy argument supporting 
strict liability. The dissent of Judge Lowdermilk in ORTHO 
PHARMACEUTICAL CORP. v. CHAPMAN (Ind. 1979), 388 N.E.2d 541, 
discusses this undesirable result. 
C. THE POLICY REASONS UNDERLYING THE SUBSEQUENT 
REMEDIAL MEASURES RULE DO NOT SUPPORT EXCLUSION 
OF THE POST-1972 PACKAGE WARNINGS. 
Current theories of relevancy adopted in the federal 
courts and in most states do not support exclusion. See 
Fed.R.Evid. 407, Advisory Committee's Note; 2 Wigmore, 
Evidence § 283 (3d Ed. 1940). The Utah Rules of Evidence 
as drafted and passed do not require exclusion of the post-
1972 warnings on the basis of relevancy. To the extent that 
BENNETT v. PILOT PRODUCTS CO. (Utah 1951}, 235 P.2d 525, 
as cited by Squibb, su9gests otherwise, it should be noted 
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that decision was rendered prior to the adoption of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence and prior to HAHN v. ARMCO STEEL, supra. 
Weinstein's Evidence§ 407(02}, pages 407-9 to 407-10, 
discusses Rule 407 of the ·Federal Rules of Evidence and 
explains some ·of the reasons the exclusionary rule should not 
be applied, as follows: 
Its underlying assumption is that a person will not 
take ·remedial measures because his corrective actions 
might be used in evidence at a future trial. The 
second assumption seems absurd. Not every defendant 
will be aware ·of the possibility that subsequent 
remedial measures might constitute an admission. Of 
-those who would know of the rule, any responsible 
insured defendant will not be likely to refrain 
deliberately from taking action to prevent the re-
currence of subsequent· serious injuries. In any sub-
sequent case,· evidence of the earlier accident would 
be admissible to show that the defendant knew of the 
dangerous conditions . • • Even if the defendant is 
as· cold-blooded as the rules suggest, his awareness 
of the many exceptions to the g~neral exclusionary 
rule would make it risky to refrain from making the 
needed repairs. Rule 407 could have been eliminated 
with no great loss. 
Squibb would have this Court believe that AULT v. 
INTERNATIONAL HARVESTER, INC. (Cal. 1974), 528 P.2d 1148; 
ROBBINS v. FARMERS UNION GRAIN TERMINAL ASSOCIATION (8th 
Cir. 1977), 552 F.2d 788, and similar cases, are contrary 
to the majority line of authority. This is not the fact. 
Squibb ignores the trial court's discretion and ignores the 
many exceptions to the exclusionary rule. In fact, the cases 
as cited by Squibb establish that admissibility of subsequent 
remedial measures is an issue to be determined on a case by 
case basis, and that the trial judge's decision to admit or 
exclude is accorded great weight, more often than not 
resulting in affirmance on appeal. 
The post-1972 warni~gs were required by the Food and 
Drug Administration. No public policy is served by excluding 
those warni~gs, and where the subsequent warnings are not out of 
a sense of social responsibility but are because of a require-
ment by a governmental ~gency, courts have held the exclusionary 
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rule inapplicable. ROZIER v. ;FORD MOTOR COMPANY .(5th Cir. 
1978) , 573 .F. 2d 1332; FARNER v. PACCAR, INC. (_8 CC.A 1977), 
562 F.2d 518 at 527; LOUISVILLE AND NASHVILLE RR COMPANY v. 
WILLIAMS (5 CCA 1966}, 370 F.2d 839;' We'i'nstei'ri's' Evidence, 
United States· Rules, Vol. 2, p~ge 407-7. 
Squibb relies· on WERNER v. UPJOHN CO. , INC. (4 CCA 
1980), 628 F.2d 848, but that case is disti~guishable. 
Upjohri itself caused the revised w·arni~g and not under any FDA 
requirement. The ·dr~g was a "new" dr~g, not one that had 
been marketed for over sixteen years, as true with Delalutin. 
With Delalutin it was never established by Squibb or anyone 
else that Delalutin was an unavoidably dangerous drug, but 
that its benefits outweighed its da~gers and, therefore! that 
marketi~g was justified. Squibb marketed Delalutin with the 
representation that, "There are no known contraindications 
to the use of Delalutin in man." In doi~g so, Squibb repre-
sented that the drug was safe and harmless. 
Comment k of 402(A) of Restatement of Torts 2nd applies 
to drugs known to be unavoidably dangerous, but which are 
marketed because the benefits to society outweigh the nega-
tive aspects when a proper warni!1g is. given, and when the 
drugs are new or experimental dr~gs. Delalutin does .not fit 
into any of these categories, and the cases as cited by Squibb 
do not apply. 
D. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY 
REFUSING TO EXCLUDE THE POST-1972 PACKAGE WARNING 
INSERT ON THE GROUNDS OF UNFAIR PREJUDICE OR 
CONFUSION PURSUANT TO U.R.E. 45 
In citi!1g TERRY v. ZIONS CO-OP MERCANTILE 
INSTITUTION (Utah 1979), 605 P.2d 314, at pages 323-325, in 
support of its a~gument under I.D, p~ge 47 of its brief, 
Squibb fails to state that the court upheld the trial court 
ruli~g because of the wide discretion accorded the trial 
court. This Court said: 
26 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
"When the trial judge weighs the matter and makes the 
determination, his ruling should be looked upon with 
indulgence and not disturbed unless it clearly appears 
that he abused his discretion. We hold that the trial 
judge committed no error in limiting the introduction 
of this evidence." (Footnotes and citations omitted .. ) 
No prejudice resulted to Squibb by reason of the ad-
mission of the post-1972 package warnings. Prejudice is 
not the same as adverse testimony. All evidence is preju-
dicial or it isn't material. Rule 45 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence necessarily ~on~emplate~ j'unfairn prejudice. It 
can only be unfair prejudice when the unfairness substantially 
outweighs the probative value. DOLLAR v. LONG MANUFACTURING 
N.C., INC. (5 CCA 1977), 561 F.2d .613, at p~ge 618; u.s~ 
v. McRAE, (5 CCA 1979), 593 F.2d 700, reheari~g denied 592 
F.2d 283, cert. denied 440 U.S. 862, 100 S.Ct. 128, 62 L.Ed. 
2d 83. In DOLLAR, ·supra, a letter sent by the manufacturer 
to its distributors after the plaintiff's injury, warning of 
da~gers of its product, was excluded by the trial court. On 
appeal, the appellate court held the letter admissible for 
impeachment purposes and that the probative value of such 
evidence substantially outweighed the danger of unfair preju-
dice to the defendant. The facts here justify the same 
conclusion. 
Squibb's briefing attempts to su9gest that the jury's 
verdict turned on the impact of the package label. The fact 
is that this cannot be established because the verdict was 
general. Furthermore, the post-1972 labeling was merely one 
of a number of factors which apparently persuaded the jury 
that Squibb was liable. The information contained in the post-
1972 pack~ge warni~g inserts was merely cumulative to what had 
already been established thro~gh the testimony of plaintiff's 
me.dical witnesses. Those witnesses had already established 
the prima facie case of causation and had_ given their opinions 
that Squibb, based upon_ the literature and the knowle~ge as 
to progestational drugs, should have warned on that basis alone; 
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and most certainly, based upon the literature, should have 
done testi!J.g. 
The cumulative nature of the post-1972 warni!J.gs and 
the fact that other· competent evidence exists to support 
the verdict, requir~s· that Squibb's a:rgument of prejudice 
be rejected. U.R.E. 61; WHEELER v. JONES (Utah 1967), 431 
P.2d 985; U.S. v. CRESCENT AMUSEMENT CO. (1945), 323 U.S. 
173, 65 S.Ct. 254, 89 L.Ed. 160, reheari~g denied 323 U.S. 
818, 65 s.ct. 437, 89 L.Ed. 650. 
Even counsel for Squibb in argument claimed that the 
post-1972 warnings were nothing more than cumulative. (Tr .. 
1312, lines 19 through 23). 
E. THE POST-1972 PACKAGE WARNING INSERTS WERE 
ADMISSIBLE FOR REBUTTAL AND IMPEACHMENT ON 
DELALUTIN'S SAFETY AND EFFICACY, AND ADEQUACY OF 
THE 1972 WARNINGS 
Squibb has not forthrightly advised of the develop-
ments maki~g it proper to admit the warni!J.g labels. Follow-
ing briefs and argument on Squibb's pretrial motion in-limine, 
the court ordered the post-1972 label changes not be 
discussed in opening statements and not be offered as 
evidence until and unless they became relevant. Barson's 
counsel complied. 
Both in Squibb's opening statement and presentation of 
testimony, Squibb so~ght to justify before the jury both the 
safety and efficacy of the dr~g by s.howi!J.g the FDA had 
earlier approved the dr~g. Squibb u:rged that Delalutin was 
safe and proper to market based upon the alleged "then 
state of the art," and asserted throughout the trial that 
Squibb had complied with all FDA requirements. 
To have left the jury with the impression Squibb sought 
.by ·excluding any evidence of the post-1972 warnings would 
have been contrary to the facts. The FDA has not determined 
Delalutin to be either safe or efficacious. Merely because 
the FDA had not required different wording in the· pre-1972 
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package inserts does not mean that the FDA had independently 
tested and determined the safety and effectiveness of 
Delalutin. Rather·, because of in<7ction on Squibb's part to 
update its pack~ge inserts in accordance with the medical 
literature, the FDA required it to do so. Squibb had an 
independent duty above and beyond any requirement of the 
FDA and did not perform that duty. 
The purpose of Squibb to establish the impression in the 
jury's mind that the licensi~g by the Food and Dr~g Adminis-
tration meant that Delalutin was safe and effective is shown 
in 
in 
at 
on 
the openi~g statement of Squibb's counsel. This is shown 
the transcript at p~ges 321, 322, 332 and 333. Particularly, 
page 322 of the transcript, lines 24 and 25 through l.ine 5 
page 323, the intent of Squibb to so mislead is demonstrated: 
" •• The ultimate question is, you're tryi~g to find 
out if it is safe in people, and the Food and Drug 
Administration in 1966 said it was ••. " · 
" ... We don't even want you to bother with teratogenic 
testing because now you are trying to find out if 1t is 
going. to hurt a rat when you know it won't hurt a 
·person ••• " 
In Squibb's cross-examination of Dr. Done, Tr. 779, line 
11, through 780, line 11, this purpose of Squibb to mislead 
is again demonstrated. A portion of that testimony is set 
forth below: 
Q. And they approved Delalutin for use in pregnant 
women; r~ght? 
A. They both approved and disapproved it. 
Q. Now, come on, Doctor. The question is, Dr. Done, 
they did approve it for use in pr~gnant women for recurrent 
and threatened abortions, did they not? 
A. They did and they also disapproved it for that. 
Once the post-1972 labels were in evidence, Squibb 
attempted to minimize the importance of FDA action, despite 
its earlier· reliance ·upon the FDA approval as showi~g the 
?Q 
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safety and efficacy of Delalutin.. In Dr. :arent' s .testimony at 
Tr. 2276, line ·23, _thio~gh ·Tr. 2280, line 1, it is clearly 
shown that Squibb maintained, and yet does, that Delalutin was 
safe and effective ·in July and A~gust of 1972 when Kathy 
Barson was injecb:~d; tha·t Delalutin had no da!1gerous side 
effects, was not terat~geriic, did not cause limb reduction 
anomalies and other· birth defects, and that the 1972 warnings 
were adequate; But, it insists all post-injection evidence 
on such ·subjects is totally inadmissible. 
Squibb first used the FDA actions, standards and require-
ments in its efforts to defend Delalutin. The developments 
at trial clearly established that the post-1972 pack~ge warn-
1ngs were properly admitted to rebut Squibb's contention- that 
because of FDA approval Delalutin was safe and efficacious. 
Further, the ·post-1972 pack~ge warni~gs were admissible to 
impeach Squibb's witnesses who testified that Delalutin was 
safe and efficacious. 
Squibb relies on ORTHO PHARMACEUTICAL CORP. v. CHAPMAN 
(Ind. 1979), 388 N.E.2d 541, in supporting the exclusionary 
rule on subsequent remedial measures. However, even that 
(page 559 of the report) said this: 
"This exception is troublesome because the feasibility 
of a precaution may bear on whether it was negligent 
not to have taken the precaution; thus, negligence 
and feasibility are often not distant iss~es~ There 
is no difficulty when the defendants open up the 
issue by claiming • • • that further precautionary 
measures we-re· not practicable or feasible. By raising 
the issue of. feasibility, defendant in effect has waived 
the protection of· Rule 407 (which generally bars the . 
admission of subsequent remedial measures), for it would 
be unfair not to allow the plaintiff to meet the issue 
by showing defet1dant' s conflicting conduct--the subse-
quent remed'iaT me·a·sures." (Emphasis supplied) 
KENNY v. SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA TRANSPORTATION 
AUTHORITY (3 CCA 1978), 581 F.2d 351, is to similar effect. 
There the court admitted subsequent remedial measures to 
rebut inferences· the defendant would create by its testimony, 
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and because the defendant had first opened the issue by 
claiming all reasonable care was bei!lg exercised, and the 
court allowed the plaintiff to attack that contention by 
showi!lg subsequent remedial measures as being inconsistent 
with that conterition. 1 
By making th~ claim Squibb did make in openi!lg statement, 
cross-examination, and in its direct case that FDA had approved 
the marketing of Delalutin, met all FDA requirements and 
standards, and a!gui~g therefr·om that Delalutin was safe and 
effective, both in 1972 and now, and that, thus, the 1972 
warning was adequate, Squibb obviously opened the door to 
rebuttal and impeachment. 2 
1 
DAVIS v. FOX RIVER TRACTOR CO (10 CCA 1975), 518 F.2d 
481; TYLER v. DOWELL, INC. (10 CCA 1960), 274 F.2d 890, at 
898-899; LEGER CONSTRUCTION, INC. v. ROBERTS, INC. (Utah 
1976), 550 P.2d 212; CARVER v. KNUTSON ELEVATORS, INC. (Ok. 
1955), _. 285 P.2d 391; SHIELDS v. CAMPBELL (Or. 1977), 
559 P.2d 1275; LARSON v. PISCHELL (Wash. 1975), 535 P.2d 833. 
The LEGER case,· ·st1pra, did not involve the exclusion under 
the subsequent remedial measures rule, but the court, at 
page 214 of the opinion, said: 
" •• ~We see no error in the trial court having 
admitted the evidence, particularly since one of 
Leger's witnesses who appeared to be an expert, opened 
the matter up and made it a legitimate target for 
cross-examination." 
Also in that case, page 215 of the Pacific Reporter, the court 
said: · 
"The record is so diffused with evidence of different 
complexion, that we are constrained to believe and hold 
that there are sufficient facts reflected therein, that 
if believed, supported the findings and this being so, 
under the rules on appeal we affirm the judgment, " 
2 Fed. Rule Ev. 407; 74 A.L.R.3d 1001; LOVE v. WOLF (Cal. 
1967), 249 C~l.App.2d 822, 58 Cal. Rptr. 42 at p~ge ~8 ~f the 
ca·1. ·Reporter·,· where Parke, Davis contended that a warni~g 
was clear arid adequate, evidence of cha!lge in warning was . 
held admissible to impeach 'the testimony of the Parke, Davis 
officials, and to show the fea·sibility of eliminati!lg unclear 
warni!lgs at an earlier date. Ther·e the· jury ha~ found the 
unclear warni!lg to be ·a causative factor producing the 
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F. THE POST-1972 PACKAGE WARNINGS ARE ADMISSIBLE UNDER 
ADDITIONAL EXCEPTIONS TO .THE SUBpEQUENT JIBMEDIAL 
MEASURES RUGE. 
(1) - F-e·as·ibili ty ·o·f· ·pr·e·ca·uti'ot1a·ry m:e·a·s·uYes 
Many jurisdictions have approved subsequent 
remedial measures (in this case the post-1972 warni~gs) to 
. . . 
show fea~ibility. LOVE v. WOLF, 249 Cal. App. 2d 822, 58 Cal. 
Rptr. 4 2, prev-iously cited and discussed, admitted a subsequent 
package warni~g insert_ in a products_liability dr~g ca~e on the 
_grounds of feasibility. Later the California Supreme Court 
approved the admission of such evidence of subsequent remedial 
measures to sho"w feasibility in a n~gligence action. This case 
has also been discussed earlier in this brief as to the public 
policy underlyi~g a products case. AULT v .. INTERNATIONAL 
HARVESTER CO. (Cal-. 1975), 528 P. 2d 1148. 3 · 
2 (Cont.) 
plaintiff's disease. In the opinion the court cited various 
cases upholding its position to the effect that post-
remedial action or warnings are admissible "on the possibility 
or feasibility of el-iminating the cause of the accident." 
To similar effect is DOLLAR v. LONG MANUFACTURING, INC. (5 CCA 
1977), 561 F.2d 613, where the issue was admissibility of a 
warning letter issued by the defendant after the accident. In 
reversing the trial court's refusal to permit the warning 
letter,· the court held that the letter could be used both to 
rebut the defendant's testimony that the equipment was safe, 
as well as for impeachment purposes. 
3 
Decisions from many jurisdictions, both- state and 
federal, have approved the admission of a subsequently modified 
warning to show the feasibility of a more adequate warning at 
the time of the plaintiff's injury. See STERNER v. u.s.-
PLYWOOD-CHAMPION PAPER, INC., 519 F.2d 1352 (8 CCA 1975) {apply-
ing Iowa law); INCOLLINGO v. EWING {1971), 444 Pa. 263, 282 
A.2d 206; JOLIE v. OHIO BRASS CO. (7 CCA 1974), 502 F.2d 741; 
DOLLAR v. LONG MANUFACTURING N.C., INC. (5 CCA 1977), 
561 F.2d 613; ROZIER v. FORD MOTOR CO., (5 CCA 1978), 
573 F.2d 1332; HYDEMAN v. PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD CO. (1959), 
152 A.2d 251. - . 
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Respondent introduced evidence that Squibb had actual 
or constructive knowledge of birth defects from progestational 
drugs as of 1972·.· 4 On~y after a prima facie case had been 
established did the trial court admit the 1979 warning. 
The "feasibility 11 inquiry is dependent upon the adequacy 
of the action a manufacturer takes to make his product safe. 
To the extent that a warning might have been made more specific 
or have been made earlier or communicated more effectively, or 
included additional suspected or established risks in sufficient 
detail, a jury is entitled to balance and weigh that which 
occurred after the injury in the way of warnings as against 
that which had occurred earlier in order to determine whether 
or not a better warni~g was feasible. In this case, i~was 
certainly disputed as to whether or not there was knowledge 
prior to 1972 which would put Squibb on notice and which would 
have required that it give a war·ning. It gave no warning at 
all to pregnant women as to the risk that might occur to the 
fetus by use of Delalutin. 
-The cost o-r: burden to Squibb, compared to the risk or 
4 Squibb argues before 1972 the state of medical knowledge 
did not include knowledge that Delalutin was teratogenic. 
The fact is the 1979 label [Ex. lO(t)] in the references 
section contains the 1967 Gal article as its first reference: 
REFERENCES 
1. Gal I, Kirman B, Stern J: Hormonal pregnancy 
tests and congenital malformation. Nature 216:83. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
.5. 
1967 
Levy, EP, Cohen A, Fraser FC: Hormone treatment 
during pegnancy and congenital heart defects. Lancet 
1:611., 1973 
Nora, J, Nora, A: Birth defects and oral contra-
ceptives. Lancet 1:941, 1973 
Janerich, DT, Pipe, JM, Gilebatis, DM: Oral contra-
ceptives and congenital limb-reduction defects. 
N. Engl. J. Med. 291:697. 1974 . 
Heinonen, OP, Slone, D, Monson, RR, et al: Cardio-
vascular birth defects and antenatal exposure to · 
female sex hormones. N. Engl. J. Med. 296:67, 1977 
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danger involved, to actually give some warning or some indica-
tion of the possibility of risk, was obviously very negligible. 5 
That the post-1972 warnings were admissible are authorities 
such as INCOLLINGO v. EWING (Pa. 1971), 282 A.2d 206. There 
a post-injury warning was admitted as evidence of what the 
defendant knew or should have known, and what the defendant 
might have done to give a similar warni~g in earlier years. 
The court advised the jury that the warni~g was not to be 
taken as evidence bearing on antecedent negligence. The 
court held that with the admonition as given, the evidence 
was admissible and could n.ot be considered prejudicial as to 
warrant reversal. To similar effect are STERNER v. U.S. PLYWOOD-
CHAMPION PAPER, INC. (8 CCA 1975), 519 F2d 1352, which 
applied Iowa law, and ROZIER v. FORD MOTOR CO. (5 CCA 1948), 
573 F.2d 1332. 
Such. warnings have also been.held admissible as proving 
causation. GIVENS v. LEDERLE {5 CCA 1977), 556 F.2d 1341. 
Similar documents were also admitted in REYES v. WYETH LAB-
ORATORIES (5 CCA 1974), 498 F.2d 1264, cert. denied 419 U.S. 
1096, 95 s.ct. 687, 42 L.Ed.2d 688. 
In the latter case, the admission of an exhibit which 
included a s·mnmary of cases of polio occurring during 1970, · 
both before and after the injection of the vaccine, was held 
admissibl.e under Federal Rules of Evidence 43 {A) as "neces-
sary and trustworthy, relevant and material." (498 F.2d 
at page 1287} .. 
5 
In addition to other authorities cited in this portion 
of the brief are INCOLLINGO v. EWING (Pa. 1971), 282 A.2d 
206; LOVE v. WOLF (Cal. 1967), 249 Cal. App.2d 822, 58 Cal. 
Rptr. 42; STERLING DRUG, INC. v. YARRON (8 CCA 1969), 
408 f.2d 978; McEWEN v. ORTHO PHARMACEUTICAL CORP. (Or. 
1974), 528 P.2d 522. 
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POINT II. THE JURY WAS PROPERLY INSTRUCTED ON THE LAW 
DETERMINATIVE OF THE 'ISSUES' AND THEORIES OF 
. "THE CASE 
Squibb assigns as error the instructions given the jury 
and the trial court's refusal to give Squibb's Proposed In-
struction lOA. Squibb speculates that the jury "could have" 
interpreted them so as to permit holding Squibb absolutely 
liable. Squibb's argument overlooks that the duty to warn 
exists even where the risk of birth defects is only to a 
statistically small number of persons. CUNNINGHAM v. CHARLES 
PFIZER & CO., INC. (Okla. 1974), 532 P.2d 1377, rehearing 
denied (1975); PARKE, DAVIS & CO. v. STROMSTODT (8 CCA 1969), 
411 F.2d 1390. STERLING DRUG v. CORNISH (8 CCA 1966), 370 
F.2d 82, rehearing denied (1977); VAUGHN v. G.D. SEARLE~ 
CO. (Ore. 1975), 536 P.2d 1247; McEWEN v. ORTHO PHARMACEUTICAL 
CORP. (Ore. 1974), 528 P.2d 522. 
It is well-settled in Utah that the jury instructions 
must/be considered as a whole, and no particular instruction 
or part thereof should be picked out and considered separately. 
DeBRY AND HILTON TRAVEL SERVICES, INC. v. CAPITAL INTERNATIONAL 
AIRWAYS, INC. (Utah 1978), 583 P.2d 1181; BLACK v. McKNIGHT 
{Utah 1977), 562 P.2d 621; WHYTE v. CHRISTENSEN (Utah 1976}, 
550 P.2d 1289~ That plausible arguments as to error can be 
made by singling out portions of instructions does not justify 
upsetting a verdict and judgment where the instructions, 
considered together, give the jury a fair understanding of the 
issues of fact to be determined and the law applicable. 
EWELL & SONS, INC. v. SALT LAKE CITY CORP. {Utah 1972), 493 
P.2d 1283. 
A fair reading of the jury instructions, considered as 
a whole, clearly refutes Squibb's contention. The instruc-
tions on all three theories are consistent in stating that 
Squibb's duty to provide a warning of hazards associated with 
use of the drug for its intended purposes is to be evaluated 
by a standard of reasonableness and, further, the scope of the 
duty to warn is limited to what Squibb actually knew or should 
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Barson (Instructions Nos. 23, 24, 27, 28}. Other instruc-
tions emphasized that Squibb was not to be ju~ged by a ?tandard 
of absolute ·liability. 
For example, the jury_ was specifically instructed that a 
manufacturer of a drug is· t1ot a guarantor that no one will 
be injured using it (Instruction No. 29); that a product 
is not defective or unreasonably da~gerous merely because it 
is possible to be i~jured while usi~g it (Instruction No. 26}; 
that the warni!lg need not be the best possible but merely 
reasonable under the circumstances (Instruction No. 28); 
,that the burden is upon the plaintiff to prove by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that Squibb failed to comply with 
the duty to provide reasonable warni~gs, and that such failure 
was the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries and damages 
(Instruction No. 23). 
Squibb contends that the jury instructions were impro-
perly submitted on all three theories of negligence, warranty 
and strict liability under the Restatement § 402A, and, 
therefore, a new trial _is required. 
This Court has lo~g held that a party is entitled to 
have his theory or theories of the case submitted to the 
jury and instruction thereon, most recently in WATTERS v. 
QUERRY (Utah 1981), 626 P.2d 455. Mere duplication or 
repetition of an idea in the instructions does not constitute 
reversible error. WOODHOUSE v. JOHNSON (Utah 1968), 436 
P.2d 442, 445. It is proper to_ give several instructions 
in order to fully and adequately describe a party's duty 
accordi~g to law, and the fact that there is more than one 
instruction does not unduly emphasize that duty. LAMKIN v. 
LYNCH (Utah 1979), 600 P.2d 530. 
It is only instructions that are confusi~g or misleading 
which constitute reversible error; however, ~nstructions may 
be so characterized only where they are contradictory, in-
consistent or misstatements of the law. WATTERS v. QUERRY, 
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supra; STATE v. OUZOUNIAN (Utah 1971}_, 491 l?.2d 1093 (prejudice 
not found). The purpose of the jury instructions is suffi-
ciently accomplished if the la~gu~ge of' the instructions is 
such that the ·issues are ·understandable and the facts are 
ascertainable to res.ol ve the issues. SHUPE v. MENLOVE (Utah 
1966), 417 P.2d 246. 
The instructions should be read in their entire context 
and. given meaning in accordance with the ordinary and usual 
meaning of the language as it would be understood by the 
jurors, rather than by resorting to undue niceties and techni-
cal distinctions. BRUNSON v. STRONG (Utah 1966), 412 P.2d 451. 
The instructions.given reveal that they were consistent, 
noncontradictory, and correctly stated the law in a pla1n 
and concise manner. The duty to warn was not unduly empha-
sized nor improperly repeated by submission of the three. 
theories of liability. 
The issues were understandable and the facts necessary 
to resolve those issues were readily ascertainable. No 
prejudicial error occurred that would require a new trial. 
The jury instructions stated the law in straightforward 
and clearly understandable la~gu~ge, and it must be presumed 
that the jury followed those instructions. 
Squibb complains of the trial court's failure to give 
its Proposed Instruction No. lOA. Refusal of a proffered 
instruction does not constitute reversible error where its 
substance is adequately covered by the instructions_ given. 
WATTERS v. QUERRY (Utah 1980), 626 P.2d 455; STRATTON v. 
NIELSON (Utah 1970), 477 P.2d 152. A party is not entitled 
to have instructions in the exact langu~ge chosen by him so 
long as the basic idea is contained in the instructions given. 
GILLESPIE v. DeJONG (Utah 1974), 520 P.2d 878. The substance 
of Squibb's Proposed Instruction lOA was adequately covered by 
the instructions given. 
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POINT III.. THE "ISSUE' OF' NEGLIGENT TESTTNG WAS PROPERLY 
'SUBMITTED 'TO .THE. 'JURY 
Squibb argues there was no evidence to show that if 
animal teratologic testi~g had been done it would 
have disclosed a causal relationship between Delalutin and 
limb reduction birth defects. Squibb misunderstands 
the record and ~gnores unfavorable evidence. 
Elsewhere in this brief we have discussed the causal 
relationship indicated by 1972 between various progestational 
drugs and birth defects.. Dr. Nora testified (Tr. 1015) that 
the human body is unable to discriminate between individual 
progestational drugs, and reacts the same to all progesta-
tional drugs. Squibb concedes that Delalutin is a progest:ationa: 
drug. The jury could reasonably have concluded that 
animal teratological testing, if performed by Squibb, would 
have disclosed the causal relationship between Delalutin and 
Elizabeth Barson's birth defects. 
This Court has consistently held that in ruling on 
motions which would take issues of fact from a jury, such 
as motions for a directed verdict and for judgment notwith-
standing the verdict, the trial court must look at the 
evidence and all reasonable inferences to be drawn in a 
light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Such 
motions may be granted only if, in so viewi~g the evidence, 
there is no substantial evidence to support a verdict~ 
On appeal, in consideri~g the trial court's ruling on such 
motions, the Supreme Court should uphold the trial court if 
such evidence exists. MEL HARDMAN PRODUCTIONS, INC. v. 
ROBINSON, (Utah 1979), 604 P.2d 913; KIM v. ANDERSON {Utah 
1980) I 610 P.2d 1270. 
A motion for a directed verdict should not be. granted 
if reasonable minds might reach different conclusions. 
WINSNESS v. M. J. CONOCO DISTRIBUTORS, INC. (Utah 1979), 
593 P.2d 1303;· ASAY .v. RAPPLEYE, (Utah 1979), 593 P.2d 132. 
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Doubts should be resolved in favor of submitting disputed 
issues to the jury. SMITH v. FRANKLIN (Utah 1962), 376 
P.2d 541. 
Squibb failed to meet the requisite condition precedent 
to the. granting of a directed verdict on the issue of negli-
. gent testing. The trial court was required to submit that 
issue: 
"Where the trial is by jury, it is within the province 
of the court to decide questions of law as distinguished 
from questions of fact, and in the performance of that 
duty it is· incurn:be·nt ·u·po·n the court to instruct the 
jury on the· law .·a·pp·1·i·cab1·e· to the theories of both 
pa·rties· ·insofar· ·a:s ·s·u·ch theories are supported by 
some ev·iden·ce. 11 (Emphasis added) 
HALL v. BLACKHAM1 (Utah.1966), 417 P.2d 664. 
If the trial court had failed to submit the theory 
of negligent testing to the jury, it would have constituted 
prejudicial error unless there was no evidence adduced to 
support it. WATTERS v. QUERRY (Utah 1981}, 626 P.2d 455. 
Squibb claims no animal model could be used to test 
Delalutin. That position ~gnores the followi~g facts: 
(1) Squibb's personnel developed a teratology testing 
capability in their own labs; 
(2) The FDA developed. guidelines and protocols for 
teratology testi~g in 1966 (Exhibit 62); 
(3) Squibb's personnel participated in the symposium 
which resulted in the Guidelines being developed; 
(4) The World Health Organization has mandated teratology 
tests for drugs used in pregnant women. 
If it is not likely that animal models would work,· how 
does Squibb explain the development of the protocols and the 
ultimate mandating by the FDA that the test be performed on 
new.drugs? Moreover, Squibb's duty to test is not discharged 
because the FDA approved marketing of Delalutin in 1956. The 
FDA only prescribe minimum standards. STEVENS v. PARKE, 
DAVIS & Co. (Cal. 197 3) , 507 P. 2d 653. 
39 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Furthermore,· there is a ·cntitinu·ing duty: to make tests 
as are reasonably nedessary to secure the production of a 
safe product. LINDQUIST v. AYERST LABORATORIES, INC. (Kan. 1980), 
607 P.2d 1339; LINDSEY v. ORTHO PHARMACEUTICAL CORP (2 CCA 1980), 
637 F.2d 87; BAKER v. ST. AGNES HOSPITAL (N.Y •. App. 1979), 
421 N.YoS.2d 81. 
Squibb fails to invite the attention of the Court to 
the fact that Squibb itself had teratology testi~g done in 
1967 on a drug it proposed to use called Deladroxite. The 
results of that teratology study are contained in Exhibit 
530. Deladroxite ·is a progestational ~gent, and the results 
of the study showed rabbits born without tails and a rabbit 
born with 13 ribs on one side and 11 ribs on the other, another 
rabbit with a left foot with 12 phalenges instead of the 
normal 16, and the study performed on rabbits resulting in 
rabbit offspring bei~g born with their hind legs misplaced, 
their skulls misshapen, and other skeletal defects. 
The record establishes that Doctors Nora, Done, and 
Goldman all testified that all pr~gestational ~gents tend 
to act alike, and the testimony of Dr. Goldman establishes 
teratological effects on rabbits (Tr. 2360), rats (Tr. 2363), 
the Piotrosky study in Poland on rabbits and rats (Tr. 2366). 
As Dr. Goldman testified, a Dr. Aarksk~g of Norway 
performed studies showing that animal models and humans 
reacted similarly to enzyme block~ge, and that the animal 
and human embryol~gy was similar (Tr~ 2371), and Giddley 
used the progestin Norethynordral in 1970 and found various 
defects in mice, includi?g skeletal anomalies. 
The statement of Squibb at p~ge 69 of its brief: 
"Further, animal testing in the nature of teratologic 
evaluation (i.e., administration to a pregnant dain with 
a s~udy.of the ·pregnant offspring) was performed by 
Squibb in the early 1960s with no adverse effects 
observed." 
is most misleadi?g. Squibb, by an·swers to interr~gatories 
and by the cross-examination of Dr. Leonard Lerner of Squibb 
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at trial, admitted that no teratol~gical testing had been 
done on Delalutin. 
The 1960 study to which Squibb refers was not for 
teratology testing. The offspring were not observed and no 
detailed examination of the skeleton was conducted. 
Dr. Nora testified (Tr. 1020) that as of 1972 a prudent 
manufacturer of dr~gs would have conducted teratological 
testing. 
At Tr. 743, lines 5 through 20, Dr. Done testified: 
Q. Let me ask it and see if I can get it out 
better. Assuming a drug was marketed from 1956 to 
1966 on pregnant women, those ten years, and then 
assume there came to the attention as of 1966 more 
knowledge about possible drugs crossing the placental 
barrier and so forth. Now in order for a drug company 
to justify not conducting teratological studies as of 
1966 when that information became known, what type of 
studies should it have been doing in those ten years 
previous in order to justify making that decision to 
not perform teratological tests? 
A. I can't really consider anything to justify that. 
Q. To justify what? 
A. Failure to then go ahead and do teratologic 
testing. I can't conceive of any tests that.would 
rule out the need for that. Perhaps I'm not under-
standi~g your question still. 
A difference of opinion existed between plaintiff's 
experts and defendant's experts as to whether teratology 
testing was necessary; and both sides presented their 
evidence to the jury.. Factual resolution by the jury, 
under proper instructions, resolved the dispute favorably 
to Elizabeth Barson, and Squibb would have the Supreme Court 
take over the fact-finding function of the jury on this 
issue. 
·. 
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POINT IV. THE TRIAL. COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED EVIDENCE 
OF" LACK OF EFFICACY OF DELALUTIN AND PRO-
. PERLY -ADMITTED TESTIMONY ·suMMARIZING THE . 
. MEDICAL. LI"TERATURE 
PART A. THE EFFICACY TESTIMONY ISSUE 
Squibb asserts e~ror in allowiJ:lg plaintiff's experts 
to testify on the· effectiveness of Delalutin in preventing 
miscarriage ~nd that there are no proper studies demonstrati:ng 
its efficacy. 
Comment k of Section 402A of the Restatement of Torts 
has been interpreted that a product is in "defective condi-
tion unreasonably daJ:lgerous if the risk of daJ:lger outweighs 
the benefit attendant to use of the product," even though 
the product is accompanied by a warniJ:lg. Certainly it is a 
question of fact for the jury to determine whether the risk 
of danger outweighs the benefit attendant the use of the 
product. 
If the drug has no benefit, then no risk of danger in 
any degree by use of the dr~g should be imposed upon the 
patient. See GASTON v. HUNTER (Ariz. 1978), 588 P.2d 326. 
Squibb, at pages 77-78, cites NEEDHAM v. WHITE LABORATORIES, 
INC., 639 F.2d 394, for the proposition that where the drug 
company defends under Comment j of Section 402A (and not 
Comment.k), that it is reversible error for the court to 
permit testimony as to lack of efficacy.. That is not the 
holding. 
In NEEDHAM the court found error because of the manner 
the jury was instructed (which error in instruction was not 
made here) • 6 
6 
The instruction in NEEDHAM allowed the jury to find 
lia.bility merely on the efficacy, as follows: 
"The plaintiff has the burden of proving by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence each of the· following propo-
sitions in count 1 of hei cbmplaint. First, that 
the defendant knew, or reasonably should have known, 
in 1952, that Dienestrol could cause cancer to the 
female offspring of a person who was using it to 
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Ju~ge Christoff erson. gave no such instruction and 
NEEDH.M-1 is totally inapplicable. Ju~ge Christofferson per-
mitted testimony on lack of efficacy because of Squibb's 
claims and on the issue of n~gligence in testi~g. 
Efficacy has a direct relationship to safety and the 
degree of risk that is acceptable. Dr. Done testified 
(Tr. 759, line 12, through Tr. 760, line 1): 
Q. Doctor, in the field of drug safety and in 
considerations of drug safety, would you state whether 
or not the ·usefulness or the efficacy of that drug 
plays a role in those safety determinations? 
A. Oh, very definitely. 
Q. Why? 
A. Well, because the safety is relative and is 
relative to, in the case of a new drug, how much good 
the drug may do. Cancer treatment drugs, for · 
example, we accept a degree of nonsafety that we would 
never accept with any other kind of drug. A drug that 
is lifesaving we may do likewise. · · 
A drug that on the other hand has very little 
efficacy, one that does not tolerate a lack of safety to 
the d~gree ·that you would if it were more important. 
Dr. Done,· without ·at1y ·objection by Squibb, testified 
as follows (Tr. 760, line 22, through Tr. 761, line 10): 
Q. Would you state whether or not the NDA includes 
the submissions by a company as to the reasons the 
company contends that a drug is efficacious? 
A. Yes, it does. That's its purpose. 
Q. And have you studied that part of the Squibb 
Company pres·entation? 
A. Yes, I have. 
6 (Cont.) 
prevent a miscarriage, or that Dienestrol was not 
apparently useful and desirable in 1952 in preventi~g 
miscarriages. 
And second, that the plaintiff was injured, and third, 
that Dienestrol was a proximate cause of the plain-
tiff's injuries. 
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Q. As a result of studying the NDA and the litera-
ture on Delalutin, have you formed an opinion as to 
whether or not the dr~g is efficacious for those two 
indications? 
A. I havee 
Q.. And what is your opinion? 
A. There is no evidence of efficacy for the pr~gnancy 
applications~ 
PART B. EXHIBIT 58 
Part B of Point IV of Squibb's brief claims error in 
admitting Exhibit 58~ It is a study by Dr. Done of many 
medical and scientific studies and establishi!lg a cause/ .. 
effect relationship between pr~gestational ~gents and birth 
defects, demonstrating the increased relative risk of deformed 
babies from mothers given progestational agents during the 
first trimester of pr~gnancy. (Tr. 714, lines 3 through 15) 
Exhibit 58 was offered as foundation for the testimony of 
Dr. Done that Delalutin is teratogenic and for the proposi-
tion that Squibb knew or should have known that fact; and 
that Squibb knew or should have known that it was unreason-
able to continue marketing the drug without proper terato-
logical testing. 
That a document such as Exhibit 58 is admissible is 
established in NEEDHAM v .. WHITE LABORATORIES, supra (which 
is the case relied upon by Squibb in the error urged in 
Point IV A immediately above) • There the court held, page 
403 of 639 F.2d: 
"A trial judge may admit a summary of voluminous 
writings into evidence. Fed.R.Evid. 1006. Admission 
of summaries is a matter that rests within the sound 
discretion of the judge. · Baitie:S v. United States, 
426 F.2d 833, 840 .(5th Cir. 1970). See also Pritchard 
v. Liggett ·&·Myers Tobacc·o· Co., 295 F.2d 292, 300 (3rd 
Cir. 1961). Before a summary is admitted, the pro-
ponent must lay a proper foundation as to the 
admissibility of the material that is summarized and 
sho'w that .. the summary is .accurate. Pritchard v. 
'Liggett & ·Myer's· Toba·cc·o· Co . , 2 9 5 F . 2d at 301 . " 
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In NEEDHAM,· ·supra, no proper foundation for the summary 
was made. But he~e, Dr. Done did read all of the articles, 
did establish in his testimony that all of them relate to 
the cause/effect relationship of pr~gestational agents and 
birth defects, and he did examine the studies in detail to 
show the increa·sed relative risk of birth defects caused by 
those progestational agents. 
The document was admitted for the purpose of showing 
the foundation studies upon which Dr. Done based his medical 
opinion, and it is well accepted that expert witnesses are 
entitled to rely on scientific studies to formulate their 
opinions, in that it is impossible in a ·lifetime for an 
expert to have per.formed all experiments relati~g to compli-
cated scientific phenomena. 
POINT V. THE TRI"AL" -COURT. DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
. "RULING .THAT NO NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE EXISTS 
'WHICH ENTITLES SQUIBH ·To A NEW TRIAL 
The fact is that there was absolutely no new evidence pre-
sented to the FDA Fertility and Maternal Health Drugs Advisory 
Committee and no action taken by that Committee different 
than what occurred in 1978 when the warning was placed on the 
package label. 
The Fertility and :Maternal Health Advisory Committee is 
la!gely a group of private practioners·. On November 5 and 
6, 1981, a_ group of 11 doctors and professors who support 
the use of progestational ~gents asked for and received an 
opportunity to present testimony to the Committee. 
Of the 11 witnesses, two actually testified at the Barson 
trial in Logan: 
(1) Dr. Len Lerner, PhD, is a former lo~g-time endo-
· crinologist with Squibb, and he presented some of the same 
testimony to the ·committee that he presented at trial, and 
presented no new evidence. 
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(2) Dr. Robert Brent, M.D., a professor from Thomas 
Jefferson University School of Medicine, also presented 
material he preserited at the trial. 
A review of the transcript of the Cormnittee heari!lgs 
(226 p~ges in Volume 1 and 54 p~ges in Volume 2), fails to 
disclose a scientific study on either safety or efficacy of 
Delalutin which was not in existence and considered by the 
expert witnesse~ during the trial. 
Of significance is specific notice of the heari!lg·was 
not published among the members of the medical and scientific 
cormnunity who take a position on the safety of the drug 
contrary to Squibb's. 
The Committee met ~gain on February 11, 1982, at whlch 
time Eve Ba~gmann, M.D., of the Public Citizen Health Research 
Group, Washi!lgton D.C., presented the opposing viewpoint. 7 
At page 5, lines 4 through 19, Dr. Bargmann's testimony reads: 
"Treatment with female hormones, including progestins, 
during pregnancy has been linked to serious dangers and 
to birth defects. The speakers at the November 1981 
meeting of this Committee spoke to criticize some of 
these studies, but they really didn't present better 
studies or better evidence to refute them, and since 
none of the studies' authors were present, you hardly 
got a balance view. Retrospective studies have linked 
· progestin use during pregnancy to a number of problems, 
including cardiovascular defects, transposition of the 
great vessels, neural tube defects, limb reduction 
·abnormalities, and increase in overall birth defects. 
Progestins also can alter genital development in both 
male and female infants. ·while different progestins 
have different degrees of androgenic effects, all of 
them, including progesterone and 17-hydroxyprogesterone, 
have been linked to genital abnormalities in infants." 
At page 6, lines 16 through 23, Dr. Bargmann stated: 
7 
"Now, several of the speakers at the last meeting tried 
to draw a distinction between progesterone and 17-
This Court has granted motions to supplement the record 
with the transcript of the Committee heari!lgs,· both as 
requested by Squibb and by Barson. 
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hydroxypr~gesterone, the so-called "natural" progester-
ones, and the ·other ones which were synthetic progesterones. 
They were sayi~g that you can't blame· the n&tural pro-
gesterones for causing birth ·defects. Now when you are 
. givi~g peo"ple ho·rmones during pregnancy, that is not a 
natural situation·." · · 
At p~ge 8, lines· 10 thro~gh 16, Dr. Ba~gmann stated: 
"In the ·mea·ntime, you are left still with a well 
designed, well-done study which shows a significant 
increase in risk-from all hormones and all progestins 
during pregnancy, and no one has produced a better study 
to refute .. this.· Nor have you seen any evidence that 
progesterone or 17-hydroxyprogesterone affects the 
developing heart any differently from any other sex · 
hormone." 
Dr. Ba~gmann's concludi!1g remarks were {p~ge 10, lines J-10): 
11 In view of the dangers of these hormones, both full 
patient information and well designed studies are manda-
tory before you unleash these dr~gs on pr~gnant women. 
Thank you." 
Counsel for Squibb urges that the "newly discovered 
evidence" is not necessarily the testimony that the eleven 
witnesses presented, but the fact that the Committee recom-
mended to the FDA that the label should be modified. 
The FDA has various committees. Their function is 
advisory only. The recommendation of the Fertility and 
Maternal Health Dr~gs Advisory Committee is not newiy dis-
covered evidence even if the recommendation had been com-
pleted and had been made, which is not the fact. 
In JAMES MANUFACTURING CO. v .. WILSON, 15 Utah 2d 210, 
390 P.2d 127, this Court ruled: 
"Granting or denying new trial on_ ground of newly dis-
covered. evidence is within sound discretion of trial 
court and its ruling is conclusive unless.there 
clearly appears an· abuse of discretion. 
The trial ju~ge issued a Memorandum Decision, dated 
January 21, 1982, and rejected Squibb•s position. 
That ruli!lg is clearly suppor.ted by this Court's prior 
decisions.· 
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In UNIVERSAL INVESTMENT CO.v. CARPETS, INCORPORATED, 
(Utah), 400 P.2d 564, this Court stated: 
"In order to warrant granting such a motion the moving 
party must meet these requirements: there must be 
material, competent evidence which is in fact 'newly 
discovered'; which by due diligence could not have 
been discovered and produced at the trial; and it 
must not be merely cumulative or incidental, but it 
must be of sufficient substance that there is a reasonable 
likelihood that with it there would have been a dif-
ferent result. Whether these requirements have been 
met rests largely within the discretion of the court; 
and unless there is a plain showing of abuse, his action 
will not be disturbed." 
Dr. Brent, Squibb's witness at trial, again appeared 
before the Fertility and Maternal Health Dr~gs Advisory 
Committee of the FDA. His testimony was no different than 
that presented at trial, except he expressed a real concern 
as to the cost of defense, not the safety of the drug. For 
example, his testimony appearing at page 72 of the trans-
cript before the Committee is as follows: 
"The tremendous cost in litigation . . . arising around 
these problems, is costing our society tremendous 
amounts of money. The defense of some of these suits 
is unbelievable. Forget about the awards. I think they 
are inconsequential compared to the cost of the defense 
in preparation." 
This concern of Dr. Brent is consistent with the atti-
tude of appellant throughout the history of Delalutin. There 
is no newly discovered evidence. Squibb simply wants to 
overturn the jury verdict in this case and obtain another 
day in court, after having fully presented its case once 
with an adverse result. Squibb is not entitled to that type 
of preferential treatment. 
CONCLUSION 
An examination of the entire record clearly establishes 
that the trial court, before admitting any evidence of the 
post-1972 warnings and inserts, required that the plaintiff 
establish a prima facie case. That is, that the medical 
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proof in behalf of the plaintiff made the connection between 
Delalutin and the birth defects in Elizabeth Barson. This was 
done. Dr. Nora, after stating his conclusion on direct 
examination (Tr. 1018-1019}, on cross-examination reiterated 
his direct testimony as follows: 
Q. You were asked if you related her anomalies to 
the exposure of Delalutin. 
A. Yes and I said I did. 
Q. You said, "I believe that the injections of Delalutin 
were the cause of the birth defects and found no other 
explanations for the cause." 
A. That's what I said. (Tr. 1148, 1149) 
Similarly, Dr. Done, without objection, testified (Tr. 764} 
that the birth defects of Elizabeth Barson were caused by 
an injection of Delalutin. 
This Court's recent decision in DAIRYLAND INSURANCE 
COMPANY v. HOLDER, ET AL (Utah 1982), 641 P.2d 136, is of 
importance ·in consideri~g the various objections of appellant 
as against the entire record. The statements made in that 
case, we respectfully submit, are applicable here. In the 
DAIRYLAND case ·the appellant relied upon insufficiency of 
the evidence, improper exclusion of testimony, and improper 
instruction of the jury. In affirming the trial court, this 
Court made ·several comments which we quote as our conclusion 
in this case. On the insufficien6y of the evidence (page 
138 of the Pacific Reporter), the Court said: 
"If there is any substantial competent evidence 
upon which ~ jury acting fairly and reasonably could 
make the ·finding it should stand. But if the finding 
is so plainly unreasonable as to convince the court 
that no jury acting fairly and reasonably could make 
the finding, it cannot be said to be supported by sub-
stantial evidence." 
On the improper exclusion of testimony, and after quoting 
Rule 61 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court (page 
139 of the Reporter) said: 
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" ••• Plaintiff has shown no reason why.the trial 
court's action, even if determined to be erroneous, 
was 'inconsistent with substantial justice' as required 
by Rule 61. Without determining whether or not this 
exclusion by the court constituted error, we hold 
that such an error would have been harmless under the 
quoted rule." 
On the .claim of improper instructions to the jury, this Court 
found the instiuctions free of error and as having appro-
priately pres·ented the factual issues to the jury. 
The record and the applicable law, as developed and 
presented in a lengthy trial, summarized in this brief, 
establish that the verdict, the ju~gment on the verdict, 
and the orders of the court on the posttrial motions, st10uld 
be affirmed in all respects. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RACINE, HUNTLEY, OLSON 
NYE & COOPER, CHARTERED 
By 
~------=-----------=-------------~ Louis F. Racine, Jr. 
JONES AND CHRISTENSEN, CHARTERED 
HILLY~RD, GUNNELL & LOW 
By 
----:G~o-r-d~o--n __ J____ L_o_w ______________ _ 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that two copies of the foregoing 
Respondent's Brief were mailed this 30th day of August, 
1982, to the followi~g attorneys, postage prepaid: 
Ray R. Christensen 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL 
900 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City,Utah 84101 
R. Layton Mank 
BLACKWELL , WALKER, GRAY, POWERS 
BLICK & HOEHL 
2400 AmeriFirst Building 
One Southeast Third Ave. 
Miami, Florida ·33131 
Lou' Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
'-.. 
v· ' }, (\ \ i'. ii!'• (j (~ d /lYt 'f)Y · \ 
SQ_l 
FILE I 
. .... 
...... .. --
... 
.. 
\ 
. 'f_ _,,I 
·.. 1'\D DATE Octohcr --22, 1974 
. ~ ' ~' 
;. -··. 
COPY lo 
.T 
Norman W .. Lavy, M.D. 
EXPOSURE TO.SEX STEROID~ 
DURING PREGN~..NCY 
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·.An· article has app~ared ·i~· ·the New Englana··J'ournai of !1edicinc 
{Volume 291, pages '697-700, October 3, .1974) ·together with an 
. editorial (pages 731-732) discussing an· a?socia.tion between . 
exposure.to sex steroids d~ring pregna~cy and the occurrence 
of···congenit-al· rnal.formations.. Both the .article ·and editorial 
suggest ."For . the pr:e.s·ent,· it: ~6uld be pr·uaent to discon.i:inuc 
the use of with~rawai~type pregnancy tests because acceptable· 
alternatives are· available." This was essentially the sam~ 
position take~ some _time ~go~by FDA. 
·While we--have disc~-ntin~ed. marketing of.Gestest, and have re- . 
moved all pre nanc related indications for use of sex steroids 
.·from our p<:tckage ins~ we should c~nsider the advisability 0 
somehow allowing our Gestest NDA to be withdrawn, as well.a~ 
.considering a package insert statement for.our other sex stqroids 
(Arnnestrogen, Neo-Amniotin, Delalutin, Dela,dumonc, Deladur.tone OB, 
Delestrogen) to the effect that the absence of pregnancy.should 
be- demonstrated before the steroid is therapeutically used • 
. :, - : . 
··~: / 
W.. Lavy, M ... D~" 
NWL/cl 
. ""·.· 
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To 
From 
~ ..... -- ~· ....... -- .... - -··. -- ._.. -- ·- """"~-
.. _) 
---- -·· ··-~--· 
Aur;u.st 4, 
Copy to ,, r ,.. ··-- . tr. n. Colcatc 
Dr. . • D • c (J :·:::. () ~- (~ ,,..._. 
f·l' 
- . J. 'l. C uJ.L <~.:-t.scn 
! :!: • .:~. J. t?.:.J_ 
Dr .. ~J. ii. Dol~in 
Dr. \T. A. }'eirer 
Dr. J. o. Lu:ipcn 
Dr. A. F. L:mGLykke 
Dr. c. n.· Lino gar 
Ur. F. J. Stock 
Dr. F. y ..... 'ITis clo gle 
Mr. n. R. Z :iJ=iG::itan 
This will acknowledge your message of July 28 regarding plans for 
prcparini:; an lIDA for Delalutin. I think your surprise at the Coordination 
!Jectir:.~ in lcar!'.inr-: of the absence of tox..i.ci ty data. on Ddal "Utin vri..s 
GU!TJ.1Sscd. by that oi' the l-1boratory l:!E:n thcrH, -.·ii10 vrnre a:iazeci that 
clinical investigation h.'.J.d been tu:-icrtakcn 1;d. th this new drug for wh.i.ch they 
h:i.d not beu1 asked to do evc:n acute toxicity st;;dies. 'i,hu situation, how(:ver, 
is now clarified. bu.t I wo1L1d still like to repeat my sug,;estion t.hat di.roct 
disct:ssion 1.-ith Dr. Linc::::ar ·would bo desirable for ar,Tecment on the details 
of concurrent ad~inistration of Dclestrogen and Delalutin. 
Dr. Console has just forr:arded to roe his copy of the use tests on 
Delaluti.'1 sent to ~Ir. Stock by ;>·ou on July 21, DSS which 11we are subraitting 
to F .D.A." .A.r:i I ">'iTong in p:rc'sl:-:1inr; taa t in the absence of cie.finite in.for-
mation that one oi our cl::.i:.~s ';jill l!c i'or t:~c '..:Se of Dclalutin in habitual 
threatened aoortiorr? Are 1.,:1e.ro l'c1·!:.aps otiwr indications which -:nay involve 
even longer thc::ca-qy? Would it ll.:Jt be anticip2..tcd that v:eekly ad.-:d.nistration 
of Dclalutin in ~o::w cases r.1i· :ht be in orocr for from 5 - 7 months of 
prcgn.;i.ncy'? I can find in yo:-;.: st:.~::1ary of rc~-'t~a ted injections only 4 patients 
·who haYe received more than 10 -r;eekly injections and only one as nany as 15. 
JJ. thouf;h the data appear e;:xce.llwt for clbin.J.ting acute toxicity and local 
rc.3.ctions U? to 4 inj ~ctions, I ri.ust of.fer the opinion th~ t F .n .A. my be a 
bit sticky about acccptinc 3 - h months use in only 4 patients, if you 
anticipate the posdble cb.~:i for use for as long as 7 nonths. t~y I point 
out too, that tl".c data on the rGi1aininr.; hOO odd patient:;; are as you 
characteri~a them a 11 u.zc test". I doubt that this will be sufficie.nt for 
purposes of filfag, and I i'e:ar your apparent assumption that~.-i:t. will be 
ade~i;.'ltc, r.1ay ba bn.scd on a rJisconccµtion. \%en we approached F .D.A. on 
Dclatcstryl and Dclestrogen, we took -..·.1iat we tl1ou1:;ht to be the justifiable 
posit.ion tr.at these wr·J:·t:! s]J:iply new esters of active ba.~cs where safety, 
activity, @~d efficacy had been adequateiy df'JUonstratcd. Yie argued .... ~hcrefore 
that r;a needed only to dc.a1onstrate the safety of enanthic and valeri~ acids. 
APP. "B" 
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Dr. E. C. Rdfonatcin, Jr. 
- 2 - August 4, 19!)5 
The F .D.A. accepted this only in part and after considerable delay. I 
car.not bdie:c that. tho F .D .A. vrill think vrc are justified in using the 
sa· .c a-00:i.~o~c11 ·.·;ith D('_~lall:.ti.n. '£his (follovdns r.y discussions vrith Dr. Lineear 
a1~~1 I:r. C·.::- ~1s) c:l:11~ot be rc:-:arli.cd as the cap2·oic acid ester of a ba::;e -r:hose 
~:::i.'c ~.:,._-, ::.L..:. i~-::.c:;, ~.-.d acJ,_:;_·1it7 1:a3 bcc:1 dc:~:u~ :.:,·.:-~:-t-e:J. Ir. E.:._ct, I t~;.j:r-J.: you 
r~.:;.:.,·~·:_,·_:L O.i·:~ t'j ~.-.c: ~,!:at l/'-'ll:.·,-:-..-h:.·::ro:'.:;-p·:·c ·cs··~c.-:,::::.e is ir.:.a.c~ive. D::2.:~lutin 
1 • ' ' • U,..,: - :.. "- -. ~ .~ er·~-.~·.;_..-~ 0.,S t.> .·.:--:~ ..... -· ..... re is ~ ;:.:..~.; c:··:>O:' .. ":':_;_ ... ~~·:.!..t~l t:~L: .. 1~;_;~ r.:-:#· .. ~):_.!~1::...-s::;. !. .. \.t.ur V---...1- u .... \...r.~v- ... J 
I feel t~i.:'lt the "Use Tcst,1: j_s totally inadu1u:ite to support an ?IDA. I 
assu:ie ho-;;::. .. 1er fro::i our c::irlicr brief discussion that you a.re fully a"';lare of 
thit> dif.:Crc~ce. !.ray I allay my anxiety hy 2.n.ticipating that the co~plete 
pac1:a£:e frc:-i you Y:ill foclude special stt.:dies directed to this consideration, 
and also exte:lsion of use in a significant mnber of patia'1ts? 
I ar:i afraid there is so:ae m.lsunderstar..ding on your part concerning 
the role vr:tic:-i I :;:l::ti i.n the r:.-:i.tt.er of !JJA 1 s. It has not been c:?.nd still is 
not my r8sp:tnsfoilit;r to set ntarL,:ct 11 date§ for filing. This h1s be~m the 
responsibilit.y of the Associate l!edical Director working in con.junQtion 'With 
the pharnacologist, toxicologist, etc. who are in turn responsible :for the 
data re::i:uired .from their areas for inclusion in an NDA. Correlation of 
various aspects of laboratory data is a responoibility of Dr. Donin•so He 
sees faat t!"lese data are assc?Jbl.cd i.."1 a for"..J. acceptable for s"..!br:iission to 
F .D. A. Tne e:.:c'.:!.CL'1Ge of pro cress notes bet-:ree..l. t~1e .Associate 1fedical Director 
dm-·in;; cl:L"lical invcsti~~ation and Dr. Don.in re:-;arcling laboratory studies has 
to d«.t.e be2:i t!:c most practicable y;ay for setting a tc.rgct cia.tc. I nn sure 
the only st!.cce~sful coordination must be a direct relationship betr.een the 
Acsociatc ~edical Director in charge of cli..~ical investigation and the labora-
tory staff while .3tt:.dies are in progress, since r::atters of dose, t.oxic 
reactions and side effects, and route of acb.inistration, can best be evaluated 
by the appointed experts. This uas the purpose for which the i!edical Division 
was :cioved to Ne1r Brunswick. 
My role is specifically the supervis1on of a finished package in 
suitable form for sub!!lission to F .n .A. - and the vaGUelY diplcmatic one of 
maintaining a useful working relationship y;i th individual nmbers of F .D .A. 
To date I have also been cl.lowed the privileGe of voicing a· protest if I regard 
tho infor.::ation sent to this office as inadequate or in a form unacceotable for 
filbg "7dth F.D.A. Any form of criticimn fro.-n nc is based cPJ.y on a l;ro\rl.ng 
experience cf what might constitute a delay in eetting clearance of new drug 
applications. 
Delays which have been occurring within our own organization 
qpparently represent fallm~es in the system of co;iuiunication. I have the 
personal conviction that by •'lOrking through the presently functioning 
Co_ordination Co..."'1lai.tteo, delays of this typo can be avoided. ~:· . 
DBR:hmz 
Douglas B. Remsen, M. D. 
Associate Medical Director 
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Dr. yr '. A. Feirer 
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Dr. A. Fa Lan~~-::kke 
Dr. c. R. Linc~~r 
Hr. F. J. Stoc'.~ 
Dr. F. y. Tiisdoglo 
Hr. D. R. Zi:rr:-:1c·n-~n.r .. 
Follomng your racssagc o.f July S in which ~mu indicated 
that adeqt:.:.;.te (tata on clinical investi;:;.ation uould soon be avail-
able for n.n ImA, I rC'1ucsted 1..o:d.colotjkal infornation fro:n our 
labor~tory. I d.igcoYcred that no \70rk ha.d been do:-1e vd. th 
Dclal-;.1tin in our laboratories and that accordi~1g to Dr. Lincr:ar• s 
house message of. July 20 (copy t.o you) he regarded the ini.'or.::ation 
available as inade-qi,;.:i.te for submission to the F.D~A· at this ti.Be. 
Dr. Linegar outlined in his house tiessage the studies he believ2s 
necessary. 
I discrnJsed with Dr. Jack Curtis of the F .D .A., last 
Friday, the toxicity data which might be req_uircd for rsvie-.v of an 
NDA. Dr. C-:.irt.is confirmed your earlior rc!Jort of assura:ice rega::rd-
in~ the ester-,csproate, but also n.r,rced uith Dr. LineGci .. r•s opinion 
that the different order of behavior of the 17-alpha-llydroxy-
prog-s:steronc-N-caproate woula require toxicity s:t,udies. He expressed 
the opinion, however, that studj.es ranr,inc .from 6 vreeks to tyro months 
mirht bA acco?table i'or review. He had no opinion to off e-r.- regarding 
possible need for concurrent adrainistration of an estro[en such ns 
Estradiol with Delnlutin. I am sure that Dr. 1,incgar should discv.as 
this point Yilth you. I can see no possibility tha.t clii.1i~:.l dE~t3. 
can bo expected to cli:uir..uto the rE.-q1u.rcm2Ilt of the F.D.A. for 
animal sti:dy of Dclalutino 
DBRahmz 
,.- . 
Doug.las B. Rans en, "·if. D, 
Associate Mcd.ico.l Director 
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ADDITIONAL NEWLY UNCOVERED CASES 
FROM RESPONDENTS-BARSON 
(SECOND SET) 
Pages 22-26, Point I (B) and {C) 
Case 
Schelbauer v. Butler Manufacturing Company, 198 Cal.Rptr. 155, 
673 P.2d 743 (Cal. 1984). 
The above-entitled case is cited to the benefit of Respondents-
Barson. 
Proposition 
Post-accident warnings are admissible as evidence in a strict 
liability case under the doctrine and rationale adopted by the 
California Supreme Court in Ault v. International Harvester 
Company, 117 Cal.Rptr. 812, 528 P.2d 1148 (Cal. 1974). In 
Schelbauer, the Court held: 
"The rationale of Ault applies as clearly to post-
accident warnings as it does to subsequent product 
repairs or improvements. Accordingly, the exclu-
sionary rule of Section 1151 was never intended to 
preclude admission of post-accident warning evidence 
in a strict liability action." 673 P.2d at 748. 
-1-
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Page 20,. Introduction 
Case 
Friederichs v. Huebener, 110 Wis.2d 581, 329 N.W.2d 890 (1983). 
The above case is cited to the benefit of Respondents-Barson. 
Proposition 
In multiple theory type actions, where evidence is properly 
admitted on one theory, the party against whom the evidence is 
admitted must request a limiting instruction that the evidence 
only be considered on the theory for which admitted, or waives 
any objection which might be raised on appeal. 
-2-
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Pages 32-33, Point (F) (1) 
Case 
Siruta v. Hesston Corp., 232 Kan. 654, 659 P.2d 799 (1983). 
The above case is cited to the benefit of Respondents-Barson. 
Proposition 
Post-accident design changes are admissible when there is an 
issue regarding the feasibility of precautionary measures. 
-3-
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DATED this ~1..--fh..~- day of March, 1984. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RACINE, OLSON, NYE, COOPER & 
BUDGE, CHARTERED 
By . 14 LOUIS~ RACINE, JR. 
Attorneys for Respondents 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 1 f~ day of March, 1984, 
I mailed a true and complete copy of the foregoing Additional 
Newly Uncovered Cases From Respondents-Barson (Second Set), 
postage prepaid, to the following: 
Ray R. Christensen 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL 
900 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 · 
R. Layton Mank 
BLACKWELL, WALKER, GRAY, POWERS, 
BLICK & HOEHL 
2400 AmeriFirst Building 
One Southeast Third Avenue 
Miami, Florida 33131 
LOUIS F. RACINE, JR. 
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